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1 Entering the ‘Home Stretch’ 
Regardless of whether negotiations relating to ABS continue after CBD 
COP-10, it is clear that all parties and participants in the ABS Working 
Group hope and expect to complete the Group’s main assignment3 before 
the end of 2010. Consequently, it is essential to build the Working 
Group’s final text on the basis of what is known and needed to make the 
system functional rather than to undertake additional studies or to pro-
pose new theories. It is essential, however, that the negotiations do 
incorporate the knowledge already obtained, particularly regarding legal 
issues and the specific legal and legislative impacts of provisions in the 
Working Group’s operational text.  
To this end, this action-paper asks a couple of question that is critical to 
the functionality of an ABS regime based on contracts and enforceable: 
First: ‘how would various proposed provisions affect the functionality of 
ABS “on-the-ground”’? And second, ‘What other provisions are needed 
in the international regime to enable adoption and implementation of a 
balanced approach with user-side measures which are compatible with 
provider legislation, by each CBD Party4 (and to encourage their adoption 
by non-CBD countries)?’ The main aim of this action-paper is to identify 
legal specific issues and proposals for making ABS functional on the 
ground. 
1.1 The Balancing Act – Creating a Functional Regime 
The main mandate of the WG-ABS is to solve the problems with Access 
and with Benefit Sharing; in the time after the entry into force of the 
CBD, the bulk focus has been on the provider side of this balance. This 
action-paper identifies the elements relevant to creating the ABS-balance, 
with primary attention to the factors which have inhibited CBD countries 
from fulfilling their user-side obligations, which user- and provider-side 
measures can enable a balanced and functional ABS implementation,5 
and the manner in which all sides are impacted if the system is developed 
in a way that makes user-side implementation impractical, unreasonable 
or undesirable. 
The world is not uniformly divided into ‘user countries’ and ‘source 
countries’. The ‘balance’ in this action-paper arises from two general 
recognitions: that any country may be a source of genetic resources, and 
that any country, whether highly developed or not, may be a ‘user 
country’.6 ABS is somewhat ‘schizophrenic’ – based on a commitment of 
all CBD countries to adopt user-side measures, while containing many 
passive obstacles to such measures.7 
1.2 The Cornerstones – Functionality and Legal Certainty for 
User and Provider 
This action-paper starts from the two apparently fixed points of depart-
ure:  
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• First, it assumes that all CBD Contracting Parties, having committed 
to Article 15 by ratifying the Convention, are therefore committed to 
fulfilling their ABS obligations.8  
• Second, it is mandated to consider the meaning and implementation 
of general calls for ‘legal certainty,’ as discussed below, as a basis 
for developing a functional ABS system.  
In commercial law, the term ‘legal certainty’ refers to the ability of each 
user, provider, national legislator, official, judge, arbitrator or other 
person to know with a relatively high degree of confidence whether the 
regime applies to a particular person or action, and if so what the regime 
will require (or probably require) in each case.9 The current negotiations 
address to the two aspects of legal certainty:  
• The commercial system is built on the ability of the user to know 
with certainty (i) which resources and rights require permission or 
payment, and which are un-owned and thus can be freely used; and 
(ii) what processes one must go through in order to acquire the 
resources and rights he desires. For each transaction, it is necessary 
to identify precisely the relevant legal requirements and costs, as part 
of the process of assessing commercial risk, and determining the 
value of the transaction.10 This is the concept most often meant when 
ABS negotiators speak of ‘legal certainty’; 
• In granting access to genetic resources and/or the right to utilize 
them, the source country and/or provider also need certainty. From 
the provider perspective, ‘legal certainty’ refers to the assurance that 
the user will comply with the terms of the countries chosen legal 
vehicle for ABS, performing his obligations and that if he fails to do 
so, the provider or source country will have avenues of legal or 
informal recourse. Although this too is an issue of legal certainty, it 
is normally referred to in ABS discussions as the need for ‘a binding 
regime’. 
The twin goals of ‘legal certainty’ and the creation of rationally func-
tional ABS regime serve as the fundamental principles underlying this 
action-paper.  
1.3 Key Issues Raised Affecting the Development of a Legally 
Functional ABS Regime 
The current negotiations of the international regime are forcing the dele-
gates to work on two fronts: On one hand, they are called to identify 
those positions and provisions that most strongly affect national positions 
and negotiate clauses which ensure that the regime will support national 
interests, while on the other hand, they are called to develop a regime that 
will function in law and in practice in a consistent and integrated way, 
across all CBD countries and sectors.  
The ABS discussions currently remain unsettled regarding the firm out-
lines of the meaning and process of ABS. As a consequence the political 
and the practical elements of the negotiations are intensively intertwined. 
The current draft text under negotiation reflects the fact that the parties 
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have been unable to separate political negotiations from functionality. 
Hence, the Paris Annex does not yet reflect a basic functional framework 
on which the delegates have agreed to move forward, but includes a vari-
ety of very different options for the operation of ABS. As a consequence, 
in addition to negotiating political positions regarding the ABS concept, 
the parties are also negotiating that concept itself, root and branch.  
1.4 Methodology  
This action-paper is focused on the current draft of the ABS Working 
Group’s Operational Text11 (the ‘Paris Annex’, as it stands following the 
end of Working Group-7). It is organised in three parts:  
a. Chapter 2 includes a tabular ‘key’ to the current headings contained 
in the Paris Annex, identifying which points in this action-paper are 
most relevant to the provisions discussed under each heading;  
b. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 identify of key points and principles affecting 
on-the-ground functionality, emphasising points raised by the ‘Paris 
Annex’. This part will discuss legal and functionality matters rele-
vant to the choice among options. It provides thoughts and practical 
solutions, focusing on key provisions on legal and practical imple-
mentation needs.  
c. Chapter 6 takes the foregoing discussion to the ground level of en-
forcement by considering how the currently existing national user-
side measures apply (or would apply) if/when they are called upon to 
address a particular legal vehicle or transaction. These discussions 
take the form of a ‘thought experiment’ (hypothetical case study) 
considering particular types of legal or administrative action and how 
they apply to the various ‘legal tools’ adopted by provider countries.  
In all three, the authors endeavour to identify specific text and practical 
solutions, where possible, and to note particular functionality issues that 
underlay the selection among options and might help to remove or mini-
mise obstacles to agreement in the present negotiations. Finally, Chapter 
7 provides some concrete proposals for completion of the current negotia-
tions. 
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2 Paris Annex Table 
The following pages identify sections of the Paris Annex that have partic-
ular relevance to the functionality issues described above, including a 
brief identification of the issues relevant to each section.  
Table 1: Paris Annex 
Pa
rt
 
Se
ct
io
n
 
Title of Paris Annex section Relevant functionality issues (sections of this action-paper) 
I - Objectives The objectives discussion in the Paris Annex operate at a higher (international 
political) level. Although very important, these provisions do not appear to 
directly impact on-the-ground functionality of ABS, and are not directly 
discussed in this action-paper. 
II - Scope Inclusion/exclusion from regime level of specificity affects legal certainty. (Ch. 
3, and see 1.1-1.3)  
III A.1 Linking access to the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits [Note relatively little of this 
part currently discusses the ‘linkage’ issues] 
Legal certainty regarding coverage of particular resources, activities and 
transactions (4.1); ensuring that these provisions are consistent with (and/or do 
not inhibit the use of) all of the standard legal vehicles currently in force for 
ABS access (4.2). Also relevant, research issues (4.3.2), transfers of genetic 
resources received under ABS (4.5.2); the relevance of ‘no ABS legislation’ in 
source country (4.2) 
III A.2 Benefits to be shared on mutually agreed 
terms 
Benefit-sharing issues (4.3.1); promoting functionality of ABS contracts (4.4); 
model and default clauses (4.6.1); compliance (4.6, generally) 
III A.3 Monetary and/or non-monetary benefits Promoting functionality of ABS contracts (4.4) 
III A.4 Access to and transfer of technology (Discussions of technology transfer in the Paris Annex are expressed as 
international political commitments. Although very important these provisions 
do not appear to have any direct impact on ABS functionality or legal certainty 
and are not discussed in this action-paper) 
III A.5 Sharing of results of research and 
development on mutually agreed terms 
Research issues (4.3.2) 
III A.6 Effective participation in research activities, 
and/or joint development in research activities 
(Discussions of ‘participation in research activities’, in the Paris Annex are 
expressed as international political commitments. Although very important 
these provisions do not appear to have any direct impact on ABS functionality 
or legal certainty and are not discussed in this action-paper) 
III A.7 Mechanisms to promote equality in 
negotiations 
Provisions in this section of the Paris Annex focus only on one aspect of 
‘Equity and/or equality’ –provisions of external assistance to traditional and 
rural groups in ABS contract negotiations (5.2). 
III A.8 Awareness-raising These issues are closely related to the discussion of incentive, motivation and 
voluntary measures (4.8) 
III A.9 Measures to ensure participation and 
involvement of indigenous and local 
communities in mutually agreed terms and 
sharing of benefits with traditional knowledge 
holders 
(Discussions of ‘measures to ensure participation and involvement of 
indigenous of local communities…’, in the Paris Annex are expressed as 
international political commitments. Although very important, these provisions 
do not appear to have any direct impact on ABS functionality or legal certainty 
and are not discussed in this action-paper.)  
A few key related issues have a practical impact, such as the benefit of 
community bio-cultural protocols and encouragement of countries and 
communities to provide clear guidance regarding which individuals or groups, if 
any, may act for or speak for the community. These issues are not further 
discussed in this action-paper. 
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Title of Paris Annex section Relevant functionality issues (sections of this action-paper) 
III A.10 Mechanisms to encourage benefits to be 
directed toward conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity and socio-economic 
development, in particular the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in accordance 
with national legislation 
(In general, provisions regarding ‘mechanisms to encourage benefits to be 
directed…’ in the Paris Annex are expressed as international political 
commitments and recommendations. As such, although very important, they 
do not appear to have direct impact on ABS functionality and are not examined 
in this action-paper.) 
III A.11 Development of international minimum 
conditions and standards’ 
Contractual functionality (4.5 and 4.6); benefit-sharing (4.4) and compliance 
measures (including model and default clauses) (4.6) 
III A.12 Benefit-sharing for every use Legal certainty regarding coverage of particular resources, activities and 
transactions (4.1)  
III A.13 Multilateral benefit sharing options when 
origin is not clear or in transboundary 
situations 
Legal certainty regarding coverage of particular resources, activities and 
transactions (4.1); contractual functionality (4.5 and 4.6); benefit-sharing (4.4); 
compliance, especially model and default clauses (4.6); bilateral agreements 
for ABS (7.3) 
III A.14 Establishment of trust funds to address 
transboundary situations 
[Not discussed in this paper] 
III A.15 Development of menus of model clauses for 
potential inclusion in material transfer 
agreements 
Compliance, especially model and default clauses (4.6). Also relevant: 
contractual functionality (4.5 and 4.6); benefit-sharing (4.4); bilateral 
agreements for ABS (7.3) 
III A.16 Enhanced utilisation of the Bonn Guidelines 
on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out 
of Their Utilisation 
(In general, the provisions regarding ‘utilization of the Bonn Guidelines..’ in the 
Paris Annex are expressed as international political objectives and 
recommendations. As such, although very important, they do not appear to 
have direct impact on regime functionality and are not examined in this action-
paper.) 
III B.1 Recognition of the sovereign rights and the 
authority of Parties to determine access 
(In general, the provisions reiterating the CBD’s ‘recognition of sovereign 
rights…’ in the Paris Annex are expressed as international political objectives 
and recommendations. These matters are not examined in this action-paper, 
however the provisions in this section of the Paris Annex as currently drafted 
also raise potential functionality issues, regarding contractual functionality (4.5 
and 4.6); benefit-sharing (4.4); compliance, especially model and default 
clauses (4.6); bilateral agreements for ABS (7.3) 
III B.2 Linkage of access to fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits 
Legal certainty regarding coverage of particular resources, activities and 
transactions (4.1, especially 4.1.2); consistency with all of the standard legal 
vehicles currently in force for ABS access (4.2); and compliance (4.6). Also 
relevant: contractual functionality (4.4); benefit sharing (4.3); research issues 
(4.3.2), transfers of genetic resources received under ABS (4.5.2); the 
relevance of ‘no ABS legislation’ in source country (4.2) 
III B.3 Legal certainty, clarity and transparency of 
access rules 
Legal certainty regarding coverage of particular resources, activities and 
transactions (4.1, especially 4.1.2); consistency with all of the standard legal 
vehicles currently in force for ABS access (4.2); and compliance (4.6)  
III B.4 Non-discrimination of access rules (In general, the Draft Operating Text provisions regarding ‘non-discrimination’ 
in the context of access to genetic resources are expressed as political 
commitments relevant to the application of international trade concepts to ABS. 
As such, although very important and interesting, they do not have direct 
impact on regime functionality and are not examined in this action-paper.) 
III B.5 International access standards (that do not 
require harmonization of domestic access 
legislation) to support compliance across 
jurisdictions 
Consistency with all of the standard legal vehicles currently in force for ABS 
access (4.2); and compliance (4.6). Also relevant: contractual functionality 
(4.4); benefit sharing (4.3); research issues (4.3.2), transfers of genetic 
resources received under ABS (4.5.2); the relevance of ‘no ABS legislation’ in 
source country (4.2) 
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Title of Paris Annex section Relevant functionality issues (sections of this action-paper) 
III B.6 Internationally developed model domestic 
legislation 
Consistency with all of the standard legal vehicles currently in force for ABS 
access (4.2); and compliance (4.6).  
III B.7 Minimization of administration and 
transaction costs 
(NO CURRENT TEXT) 
III B.8 Simplified access rules for noncommercial 
research 
Research (4.3.2) 
III C.1 Development of tools to encourage compliance Compliance (4.6) and certificates and communication tools (4.7) 
III C.1 Development of tools to monitor compliance Compliance (4.6) and certificates and communication tools (4.7) 
III C.1 Development of tools to enforce compliance Compliance (4.6) and certificates and communication tools (4.7) 
Many, but certainly not all, elements of Part III. of the Paris Annex have 
the potential either to enable the creation and operation of a legally and 
practically functional regime, or to be an obstacle to that functionality.  
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3 Objectives and Scope 
In most international instruments, decisions relating to the instrument’s 
‘objectives’ and ‘scope’ are international policy choices. They constitute 
the countries’ agreement on their shared objectives and commitments at 
the international level, but do not create or define direct obligations or 
limits on national legislation or the actions of private individuals and 
companies. In the ABS negotiations, by contrast, some of the objective 
and scope proposals in the international ABS negotiations appear to have 
this impact; while others (those relating to scope) have the potential to 
directly impact regime functionality.  
3.1 Objectives 
As one might expect, the Paris Annex’s provisions in Part I, regarding 
‘Objectives’, address political and international decisions, rather than the 
on-the-ground matters needed to create a functional ABS system based 
on individual transactions. For this reason, although very important, these 
provisions are outside the mandate of this action-paper and will not be 
further discussed. 
3.2 Scope Provisions 
The Paris Annex’s discussions of the scope12 of the international ABS 
regime have a broad potential impact. These proposals may affect not 
only the international political commitment, but also the impact of nation-
al ABS law, including user-side measures. Various scoping options in the 
Paris Annex refer to other legal regimes (outside the CBD), which as 
potentially relevant to a particular resource, transaction or activity under 
the ABS regime. Decisions of the international regime negotiators could 
have a direct effect on individual ABS contracts. If the negotiators choose 
to unilaterally integrate other instruments into the ABS regime, this will 
determine which international system governs each individual on-the 
ground transaction in a resource, transaction or activity.  
Regardless of which (if any) of these proposals is adopted, they can have 
a positive or negative impact on ‘regime functionality’, depending on 
how specifically they define the particular relationships among the vari-
ous instruments. As an example, if the scope is not written very clearly, 
one CBD country may view the scope of the ABS regime in a very broad 
way, and may expect another CBD country to apply user measures to 
particular ABS contract or activity.. If that second country has a narrower 
view of the scope of the ABS regime, it may not feel that is user mea-
sures apply to that situation. As a result, the legal regime would be con-
troversial – neither functional nor legally certain. 
At the contract level, the International Regime can be legally certain in 
cross-border situations only where each user, provider, agency, judge, 
arbitrator or other person can know precisely which regime applies to 
each individual resource or activity. 
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In developing international agreement regarding the ABS process, it is 
essential to be very clear on the scope – not only what is included, but 
what is exempted. In deciding what is included within the regime, one 
might also ask which technical issues the CBD Secretariat, COP, delega-
tions and focal points will be able to address. Similarly, when deciding on 
an exemption, one must not only ask whether some other regime applies 
to a genetic resource, activity or transaction, but also whether that other 
regime will address CBD-related concerns in connection with that re-
source, activity or transaction. Finally, it is useful to remember that, in all 
areas of commercial operation, it is common for more than one legal 
regime to apply to each resource transaction or activity. 
Specifically, whether the negotiators choose to define the basic scope in 
positive terms or by stating exemptions or exclusions, it is essential to 
provide or identify a clear dividing line between what is included in ABS 
and what is not. The following examples (relating to exemptions pro-
posed in the Paris Annex) neither recommend nor oppose particular 
provisions, but only suggest particular questions that must be answered in 
the drafting scope provisions in order that the coverage of the regime will 
be sufficiently certain to enable cross-border implementation: 
3.2.1 Example: Clarifying the Relationship between ABS and the 
ITPGRFA 
The best example of the need for clear ‘mapping’ of the relationship be-
tween international instruments involves the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Plant and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) and the interna-
tional ABS regime. For purposes of legal certainty, it is important to 
clarify the relationship between the two systems.13 Several proposals in 
Part II of the Paris Annex suggest an ITPGRFA exclusion, but differ on 
the scope of that exclusion. Some would exclude all plant genetic 
resources (PGR); others only PGR being used in food and agriculture 
(PGRFA). A third separate option would exclude only crops listed in 
Annex 1 of the Treaty.  
Deciding among these options, however, is only the first step of the 
exception. The second step would seek to achieve the higher level of 
specificity necessary for cross-border legal certainty, as described above.  
The next questions in this process would depend on which of the above 
options is chosen. Thus, if the regime exempts ‘all PGR’, it will be neces-
sary to consider whether the ABS regime’s non-agriculture concerns can 
still be fully addressed with regard to PGR. Is there a need to develop a 
coordination mechanism? If the Treaty does not address the concerns of 
the CBD, will there be any means for the ABS process to cover this 
omission? Similarly, if the second option (exempting all PGRFA) is 
chosen, how will the CBD countries consistently distinguish between 
PGRFA and other PGR? If the third option (exception for all crops listed 
in ITPGRFA Annex 1), it will be essential to determine which rules 
govern non-Annex-1 crops: 
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A number of other factors may, depending on the Countries’ decision, 
affect the functionality of the relationship between the two instruments, 
including the following: 
1. Which regime governs PGR that are acquired for purposes other than 
agriculture?  
2. If the ITPGRFA assumes full responsibility for PGR, but addresses 
only agriculturally-oriented PGR, will non-agricultural PGR be 
included in ABS or left unregulated? 
3. Which regime’s rules will apply to the PGR of the seventy-five CBD 
countries that are not Party to the ITPGRFA? Is PGR from these 
countries covered by ABS, or is it outside both regimes? 
4. Where the Treaty deems that a plant species is not ‘of actual or 
potential value for food and agriculture’, is it –  
• still covered by the ITPGR exception? OR 
• covered by the ABS regime? OR  
• not covered by any regime? 
Failure of the negotiations to answer these questions will ultimately 
create a grey area of legal uncertainty in the regime. 
3.2.2 Example: UNCLOS and Marine Areas 
In discussions of potential exemptions of marine resources, it will be 
important not only be clear, but also to consider the impact that CBD 
provisions might have on the UNCLOS regime. It is especially important 
to examine whether the exemption might alter the current marine juris-
dictional balance, which would make it difficult for particular CBD 
countries to participate in the ABS regime. Some questions that might 
help clarify a marine exemption for functionality purposes include the 
following: 
1. What specific ocean areas will the ABS regime consider to be 
‘beyond national jurisdiction’?14  
2. Shall (or ‘how should’) the marine activities, rights and resources of 
CBD countries that are not party to UNCLOS be included or 
excluded from the regime?15  
3. Will an exemption mean that all ‘marine genetic resources beyond 
national jurisdiction’ (however defined) are left unregulated 
(excluded from all ABS-related requirements and not specifically 
addressed by UNCLOS)?16 
4. How will the exception ensure that it does not prevent each country 
from enforcing its rights to marine genetic resources from its 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on its outer continental shelf 
(OCS)?17  
An undefined scope would also create uncertainty when it comes to the 
need to externally verify the characteristics of the resource under the two 
international regimes (i.e., a particular genetic resources was obtained 
from an ‘ocean area outside the scope of national jurisdiction’). 
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3.2.3 Example: CCAMLR and the Antarctic Treaty System  
Similarly, the CCAMLR-related exemptions may call upon the parties to 
ask particular questions about the specific relationship between ABS and 
the Antarctic Treaty system (ATS), with particular attention to its Con-
vention on the Conservation of Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). 
1. What specific rights and rules of CCAMLR/ATS address access and 
benefit-sharing? 
2. Are CBD countries that are not party to CCAMLR/ATS engaging in 
Antarctic marine activities? If so, shall they be included in or 
excluded from the ABS regime?18  
3. If a CCAMLR/ATS exemption is adopted, shall any part of the ABS 
regime apply to resources taken from the Antarctic Treaty Area?  
3.2.4 Summary: Scope and Objectives 
In summary, functionality is not affect by which choices the parties make 
regarding the scope of the ABS regime, but can be seriously affected by 
how those choices are expressed. It is essential that the scope provisions 
are expressed in a way that increases regime certainty, rather than adding 
to confusion. 
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4 System Provisions for Creating Regime 
Functionality 
The bulk of the Paris Annex is contained in Part III, which addresses the 
‘main components’ of the regime (benefit-sharing, access and compli-
ance). The structure of this chapter follows the temporal structure of an 
ABS relationship from collection to benefit-sharing. These provisions 
raise many points which might impact the functionality of the Interna-
tional ABS Regime.  
4.1 The Three Faces of Genetic Resources 
A commercially acceptable level of legal certainty can exist in ABS only 
where all participants in any transaction involving biological material or 
rights can answer the following question with certainty: ‘Is the subject 
matter of this contract a “genetic resource” or not?’ 
4.1.1 The ‘Genetic Resources’ Challenge 
As discussed by many commentators, however, this question is difficult 
to answer, and there is a very broad spectrum of conflicting definitions, 
each of which presents a different challenge for the regime. On one side, 
is the view that ‘genetic resources’ refers to physical specimens and that 
ABS should be a process to control their movement. On the other, ‘gene-
tic resources’ is seen to refer to the intangible, informational component.  
4.1.1.1 Options Currently under Consideration 
The Paris Annex currently indicates three primary options for clarifi-
cation of the basic operational coverage of the regime.  
• To link access to benefit-sharing, so that benefit sharing applies 
only to genetic resources acquired under and ABS Contract or 
PIC/MAT. Although it would simplify ABS in some ways (there 
would be no need for a court to determine which resources are 
‘genetic resources’) this approach creates significant loopholes and 
perverse incentives. A user who obtained genetic resources through a 
middleman or in some other way would be excluded from ABS. This 
fact would create a perverse incentive of all users to find different 
pathways to obtain samples, and thereby avoid the source country’s 
access process. 19 
• To require benefit-sharing for every use of genetic resources no 
matter how obtained. While it might could eliminate the loopholes 
described above, this approach would inject a very high level of 
complication and uncertainty into the regime – forcing courts and 
implementing agencies to prove whether every substance used in a 
product was a ‘genetic resource’.  
• To apply ABS to all biological resources. Although this approach 
eliminates the ‘genetic resources’ threshold, it would require the 
parties either to apply ABS to an incredibly large volume of material 
(e.g., all raw materials, seeds, animals, food, textiles, lumber, etc) 
and number of transactions or to find some other basis for choosing 
which resources must meet ABS requirements.20 
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These options been partially studied by many legal and legislative ex-
perts, and are well documented in many publications.21 For purposes of 
providing the basis for a functional ABS framework, it is necessary to 
clarify the selected option, and to make it functional and enforceable.  
4.1.1.2 A Functional Approach to the Primary Genetic Resource Issue 
The central definition problem (‘genetic resources’) is perceived very 
differently at each of the key moments of ABS – at access; at utilisation 
of genetic resources; and at the point that benefits arise from that utilisa-
tion.  
At the point of access, the difference between ‘genetic resources’ (gov-
erned by the ABS regime) and ‘biological resources’ (outside the ABS 
regime) appears to rely on the intention of the person obtaining and/or 
removing the resource. To make this determination one must either ac-
cept the word of that person, or possess the supernatural ability to predict 
and prove the intended future use of the material.  
At the point of ‘utilisation’, however, there is less need for speculation or 
mind reading. Utilisation can normally be verified externally, by any 
person, entity or agency that can enter or inspect the place of utilisation; 
however, there is a need to develop a clearer understanding of the mean-
ing of ‘utilization of genetic resource’. Unlike the ‘genetic resource’-
based approaches above, however, it is possible to establish criteria for 
determine whether a particular activity is utilisation of genetic resources 
or not. 
Finally, at the point of ‘benefits arising’, the regime again appears to rely 
on the user to disclose whether a benefit has arisen and whether it arose 
from the utilisation of genetic resources.  
4.1.2 Solving the Definitional Challenge 
Uncertainties regarding the specific nature of ‘genetic resources’ pervade 
the entire regime, and affect the feasibility of every provision in the Paris 
Annex. For purposes of ABS functionality, it is essential for the negotia-
tions to determine whether it will apply three different approaches (a dif-
ferent approach for each of the three key stages described above) or to 
attempt to apply a unified view across the entire ABS process. In either 
case, it is essential to determine how the concept of ‘genetic resources’ 
genetic resources will be defined and used in a legally certain and practi-
cally functional way. In this section, the authors consider a structural 
solution that might allow progress without forcing the Parties to agree on 
a definition of ‘genetic resources’. 
4.1.2.1 The ‘Baby and the Bath’ – Supporting ABS Complying Users, 
while Addressing the Problem of Non-Compliance  
One serious difference of perspective dividing participants in the ABS 
regime negotiations becomes clearest during discussions on compliance.  
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On one side, most analyses that attempt to develop a functioning regime 
are primarily focused on users who wish to comply with ABS. These 
users and bioprospectors make no attempt to conceal their desire to 
search and screen an area or a grouping of organisms. Being clear about 
their ‘genetic-resource-utilisation’ intention, these users generally seek to 
comply with access legislation and contracts. Nearly all proposals relat-
ing to the ABS framework assume that users will obtain ABS contracts 
and be governed by those contracts. Nearly all regime framework pro-
posals are built upon this basis, and assume that all national level legal 
vehicles for ABS are equivalent to an ABS contract.22 As noted in Chap-
ter 6, below, there are still serious legal challenges for ABS interpretation 
and enforcement against this category of users, but these obstacles are 
generally practical in nature, and able to be addressed by legal solutions.   
By contrast, most discussions regarding ABS compliance focus on the 
number of persons and entities who are using genetic resources without 
ABS contracts. Measures that are sufficient to regulate users who wish to 
comply with ABS will normally not be sufficient to enforce provider-side 
requirements, especially where the user is operating outside of the 
provider-side country.  
It is critical that the regime consider and support the needs of collectors 
and users who comply with ABS requirements, and recognise their posi-
tive contribution to international conservation, sustainable use and equity.  
4.1.2.2 Manifesting Intent: The Utilisation of Genetic Resources 
In a large number of bioprospecting and resource collection activities, 
however, it is not easy to identify the intention of the collector or demon-
strate that he is collecting ‘genetic’ rather than ‘biological’ resources. For 
purposes of functionality, it appears important to release the ABS system 
from the bondage of species-by-species or specimen-by-specimen over-
sight responsibilities. Commentators note that a regime can best be en-
forced where its basic threshold matters may be empirically or externally 
determined. To make ABS determinations objective, they must be tied to 
specific characteristics. As noted above, however, cross-border legal 
certainty is a critical prerequisite for ABS to be both functional and legal 
certain. CBD countries, their decision-makers and all parties to ABS con-
tracts and other legal vehicles must know whether each particular re-
source or activity is governed by the ABS regime. Hence, a functional 
regime requires that the CBD countries share a unified overview of the 
ABS regime framework during all stage of each individual ABS trans-
action. The most effective solution would appear to be one which 
(1) maximizes externally verifiability (legal certainty) and (2) minimises 
loopholes; and (3) create benefit-sharing incentives for users and user-
countries (see section 4.8 below). In this section, the authors offer a 
structural solution that might allow progress without forcing the Parties to 
agree on a definition of ‘genetic resources’.  
As detailed in other writing, the text of Article 15 seems to adopt ‘utilisa-
tion’ as the link between the ‘genetic resources’ (a scoping concept) and 
‘benefit sharing’ (the expected outcome of ABS).23 A regime whose 
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operative requirements focus on utilisation of genetic resources has two 
primary advantages as a conceptual basis for ABS: 
• It is objectively verifiable, as compared with systems (described 
above) focused on ‘genetic resources’, which rely on knowing the 
intent of the person holding the resource (which may change with 
time, or if the resource changes hands.)24 By comparison, a func-
tional definition of ‘utilization of genetic resources’ is potentially 
much easier to create, without broadening ABS coverage to all 
‘biological resources’.  
• The phrase ‘utilization of genetic resources’ has not previously been 
defined in the CBD, so that the delegates may feel free to determine 
what it means by adopting a definition or approach that will enable 
and support on-the-ground operation of ABS.  
Most important, a focus on utilisation has the potential to vastly simplify 
ABS, both practically and legally. In theory, it can be easier to recognize 
each ‘utilisation of genetic resources’ than to guess which biological 
material have been used and prove whether each of them ‘biological’ or 
‘genetic’. If the approach focuses on ‘utilisation of genetic resources’, 
which is more apparent on the user-side of each transaction than on the 
provider side, it may decrease the number of activities and approvals 
required at the time of collection – ‘streamlining the access process’ 
without diminishing ABS coverage or obligations.  
To orient the regime around ‘utilization of genetic resources’, however, it 
would be necessary to define that concept concretely, to enable all parties 
to know or easily determine whether each individual activity is governed 
by ABS. Although this is a difficult task, it can both concretise the gene-
tic resources concept and serve as an objective standard by which all 
participants can know whether and when ABS applies.  
If it chooses to focus the regime around utilisation, the Working Group 
could approach it in four possible ways or a combination25 of two or more 
of them: 
(i) a legislatively concrete description of characteristics of ‘utilization of 
genetic resources’ (either in general or by sector26). Activities meet 
these characteristics must be subject to ABS oversight; 
(ii) a specific list of specific activities that constitute “utilisation of gene-
tic resources (coupled with a mechanism for the governing body 
(CBD COP or a body created for ABS) to amend the list if neces-
sary);  
(iii) a mechanism by which a source country may declare that a particular 
user’s activity does not utilize genetic resources; and/or 
(iv) a mechanism by which a user whose activity appears on the list can 
prove that he does not utilize any biological material of foreign 
origin.  
Successful drafting of this kind of objective system as a basis for func-
tionality of the regime would depend on two key factors: (a) any criteria 
or list (options i and ii) must be recognized as binding among CBD 
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countries, with all of them agreeing in advance to apply to the system to 
all listed activities; and (b) the list must include flexibility factors, such as 
those described in options iii and iv, above. 
The utilisation-base approach would also make it easier to resolve exist-
ing controversies over, e.g., research (discussed at 4.3.2), which could be 
defined through a separate list of activities, which may then be subject to 
separately specified standards; and the development of a single under-
standing which integrates concerns and misunderstandings related to 
‘derivatives’ and ‘products’ (discussed at 4.5.3.) 
4.1.2.3 ‘Benefits Arising’  
The third face of ABS is to determine the point of time for when benefits 
‘arise out of utilisation’ of genetic resources, and must be shared (unless 
an ABS contract exists stating a different time and/or type of benefit-
sharing.) According to Article 15.7 this is the point of time when benefits 
shall be shared. When benefits have arisen they are not longer potential, 
but have materialised in the making of concrete results. This point in the 
ABS time-line is also external verifiable. In additional to financial bene-
fits, genetic resources often produce benefits such as IPRs, new product 
approvals; and other marketing/export requirements, which may be more 
easily and externally identified. The challenge of using these as ‘check 
points’ lies in finding a way to externally determine whether the IPR, ap-
proval or other permit relates to a genetic resource. Thus, the ‘utilisation 
approach’ might be useful, eliminating that step. 
4.1.3 Summarising the ‘Genetic Resources’ Challenge 
Ultimately, benefit-sharing obligations could fall into two categories: 
• Fixed-point for benefit-sharing: For some types of benefits which 
can be shared under an ABS system, it might be relevant and easily 
externally verifiable a fixed point of time when benefits have been 
created in a way sufficiently beneficial to the user of the resources 
that the ABS would oblige him to share a fair and equitable part of 
them with the provider.  
• Process-oriented benefit-sharing: Other types of benefits (e.g., re-
search results), need take a rather more flexible form, calling for a 
more dynamic understanding and implementation.  
This distinction could be recognised by identifying different categories of 
utilisation (defined according to the suggestions in sections 4.1.2.2 and 
7.1.2.3) and linking them to with their more specific requirements and 
expectations. Establishing such clear rules would add to the legal certain-
ty of the ABS-system as users of genetic resources would have an easier 
task in determining when they are supposed to share benefits, user coun-
tries would have a clearer idea of how they could expect benefits to be 
shared and mechanisms to clarify particular difficult aspects. In that case, 
courts, administrative bodies and arbitrators could identify or develop 
clearer rules and be which they would be more likely to apply and 
enforce in case of an accusation of infringement of that contract. 
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4.2 Primary Legal Vehicles of Access to Genetic Resources 
The ABS rights and responsibilities under the CBD are seen to revolve 
around the provider/source country and the manner in which they exer-
cise their sovereign rights over those resources. Currently, there are 
already nearly 20 examples of national ABS provisions through which 
CBD countries implement the concepts of ‘Prior Informed Consent’ 
(PIC) and ‘Mutually Agreed Terms’ (MAT). Separately required for ac-
cess and for benefit sharing, MAT was believed at the time of the original 
negotiations to eliminate the need for detailed negotiations about the 
implementation of ABS, by placing ABS under the framework of national 
contractual law (a kind of law that exists in all countries).27 Since 1992, 
CBD parties have addressed their responsibilities regarding PIC and the 
two MAT processes in many different ways.28  
The Working Group has generally agreed that the use of a contracts-
oriented system must be retained. It has also agreed that its output should 
not invalidate legislative and operational choices that have been made by 
CBD countries up to now regarding the provider-side of the ABS process. 
To ensure that this objective is met, however, it is not necessary to protect 
all options, only those that have been taken up to now. The following 
appear to be all of the recognized approaches (legal vehicles) to the 
‘provider side’ of ABS implementation:  
1. Enforceable contracts; 
2. Other contractual instruments that are (intentionally or unintentional-
ly) unenforceable (including Memoranda of Understanding and other 
non-binding instruments, as well as purported contracts that contain 
no enforceable provisions) 
3. Implied or ‘equitable’ (de facto) contracts (including the innovative 
use of shrink-wrap and click-wrap contract mechanisms in the 
ITPGRFA); 
4. Permits that qualify for contractual interpretation or enforcement at 
law;29 
5. National law imposing other permit or approval requirements; 
6. National law imposing requirements without specific permit or ap-
proval; 
7. No relevant national law 
8. Transactions which the parties believe to be outside the scope of the 
ABS regime 
As shown in Table 2, these eight options have been applied in ABS 
situations, with varying results. Within the several of these options, there 
are a variety of sub-options which have not been fully applied.30 Regard-
ing the nine options listed above, a few frequently misunderstood points 
must be noted:  
• Even where not formally ‘enforceable’ by law, tools 1-4 have been 
used and can operate relatively effectively in cross-border situa-
tions31; while 5-8 are normally operable only in the country of the 
provider.32  
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• The value and use of non-binding contractual instruments is fre-
quently understated. The parties to such instruments are bound by a 
‘duty of good faith’, to ‘use best efforts’ to achieve the instrument’s 
objectives. Most parties to ABS contracts are more willing to agree 
to a non-binding instrument quickly, and such instruments often 
constitute the initial element of a long-term relationship. As a result, 
in many situations, those parties may be best served by a non-binding 
instrument.33 
• Similarly, there may be many explanations where there is no ABS 
law. Often it may indicate a country’s belief that its existing law (of 
sovereign powers, property ownership, natural resources, contracts, 
trade, and many other issues) is sufficient, genetic resources derive 
from ‘the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources’.34 A 
State must normally adopt a legislative or executive instrument in 
order to waive any claim on benefits arising from its genetic 
resources.35 The CHM contains no indication that any states have 
made such a formal declaration abandoning their sovereign right to 
control their genetic resources and seek a share in the benefits arising 
from their utilisation. 
• Finally, parties to ABS contract have frequently concluded that their 
proposed transaction is outside the scope of the ABS regime.36 The 
legal correctness of these conclusions has rarely been examined, and 
is frequently not agreed by the ABS officials, law or focal point of 
the country involved.  
Within the current negotiations, the delegates appear to view the breadth 
of current tools for ABS to be a factor limiting the precision and detail of 
the Paris Annex. Both precision and detail are essential to functionality. 
This action-paper seeks to identify issues and options that can increase 
functionality while supporting (or not inhibiting) any of these legal 
vehicles.  
Table 2: Use of Legal tools 
Legal tool for ABS (access-side) 
implementation 
On-the-ground experience with this tool37 
Enforceable contracts 12 countries require a formal contract under their national law 
MoUs and other unenforceable contractual 
instruments  
Although the MOU option is not mentioned in the law of any country, nearly all 
ABS contracts between a provider and a user are unenforceable at law 
Implied or ‘equitable’ (de facto) contracts  This is the tool chosen by the ITPGRFA  
Permits enforceable as contracts 15 national laws require negotiation of permits in a way that might render them 
enforceable as contracts. 
Other permits, licenses or approvals 8 national laws appear to impose permit requirements that would not be 
enforceable as contracts.  
Relevant regulatory control by law or 
agency, requiring no permit or approval 
18 national laws impose specific requirements on users and collectors and presume 
that they will be enforceable even after collection has occurred (i.e., when the user 
may have taken the resources and left the country.) 
No relevant national law Only 39 countries have filed any measures in the ABS database, and only about 18 
of these include binding legal requirements. Other national law may be relevant, 
even if not called ‘ABS law’ or mentioning ‘genetic resources’. . 
Transactions outside the scope of the ABS 
regime 
A large number of researchers, commercial users and other have concluded that 
their activities are outside the scope of ABS, citing various reasons.38  
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In sections 6.1 and 6.3 below, the hypothetical case-study of enforcing 
provider-side ABS law under Norway’s user-side law provides some 
critical information about how provider-side tools would fare in a user-
side enforcement action.  
4.3 Sharing Benefits and Research Results 
The central issues of the ABS discussion of benefit-sharing relate to the 
nature of the obligation to share benefits and the means by which this 
duty along with the obligation to share research results can be applied in 
each separate ABS activity. 
4.3.1 Benefit-sharing 
The CBD’s benefit-sharing obligation is focused on the ‘benefits arising 
from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources’. It is these 
benefits which must be shared equitably.  
4.3.1.1 Benefit-sharing and the Functionality of ABS 
In the commercial sector, legal certainty of the user or purchaser of a 
resource is intrinsically connected to payment obligations (financial or 
non-financial) as well as other kinds of costs that may be incurred 
(including transaction costs, delays, and lost opportunities).39 For the 
receiving party (provider and/or source country), legal certainty in ABS 
depends on assurance that the user will meet his benefit-sharing obli-
gations, certainty regarding how the benefits and payments will be val-
ued, and confidence that he can take effective action in the event that the 
user violates the laws or conditions relevant to ABS or breaches an ABS 
contract. For both, legal certainty exists where all parties know what is 
expected, and when a duty to act or a necessary condition has triggered 
the right of the provider to take action.  
4.3.1.2 Making Benefit-sharing Work 
It has generally been accepted that the benefits to be shared under ABS 
must be determined in the first instance through MAT or the negotiation 
of a legally acceptable ABS contract. It is also agreed that, when devel-
oped in this way, benefit-sharing may take any form that the parties agree 
upon. The wording of Article 15.7 however suggests that where there is 
no MAT, benefit sharing is triggered when benefits ‘aris[e] out of the 
utilisation of genetic resources’. The challenge is to balance the carving 
out of relevant criteria for capturing all the activities creating benefits 
from the utilisation of genetic resources covered by the scope of ABS. 
As noted in 6.3, this challenge arises where the user has not sought access 
to genetic resources through officially agreed processes in the source 
country, has not negotiated an ‘ABS Contract’ and most important has 
not complied with the duty to agree upon MAT regarding benefit-
sharing.40 In general, until the international negotiations can develop 
some alternative approach, the courts cannot force either party to an ABS 
contract to accept a non-monetary benefit to which he has not affirma-
tively/actually agreed. Where the user has not obtained specific ABS per-
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mission, the court or arbitrator adjudicating a claim for ABS compliance 
must either call for the payment of financial benefits or refuse to rule at 
all. This indicates a high level of legal uncertainty for both user and 
provider.  
As demonstrated by other recent instruments, such as the ITPGRFA and 
the Cartagena Protocol, if the parties cannot agree on such matters 
immediately, it is possible to specify a process by which the Governing 
Body is charged to address technical matters at some later time.41 Experi-
ence has shown, however, that this kind of post-adoption development 
can be very difficult. As a consequence, the more specific details that can 
be agreed during the Working Group’s negotiations, the better for the 
functionality of the regime.  
Potential text on this point might include the following:  
• Where the user and provider have agreed upon MAT relating to 
benefit-sharing, in conformance with CBD Article 15 and the 
national law of the provider, those mutually agreed terms shall 
govern all judicial or arbitral decisions taken in user country, 
provider country or any other body, regarding benefit-sharing.  
• Within XX years following [entry into force of this document/some 
other date], the [Governing Body/some other body] shall adopt a 
schedule or standard for determination of the amount to be paid as 
‘benefit-sharing’ in cases in which the user has failed to comply 
with the law of the provider. Such schedule may be in the form of 
‘penalty/remedial guidelines’ and may be divided by sector or 
according to the list of activities constituting ‘utilization of genetic 
resources’. It shall specifically define the point at which a claim for 
benefit-sharing can be commenced42 and the method for identifying 
the particular benefits that must be shared.  
• Any authorised administrative, judicial or arbitral determination of 
such user’s benefit-sharing obligation, which is given with 
jurisdiction over all parties to the MAT, shall be a final decision 
regarding the specific obligation addressed, but shall not prevent 
either the user country, provider country or provider from seeking 
remedies or penalties for any other violation. 
4.3.2 Research  
The impact of ABS on commercial and non-commercial research has 
been a challenge since the adoption of the CBD. Researchers were among 
the earliest voices calling for the negotiation of the Convention,43 but 
rapidly changed their tune when early national responses to Article 15 
caused CBD countries to impose temporary moratoriums on their external 
research while they considered their options. Over time, a further serious 
challenge that has arisen under Article 15, relates to the sharing of re-
search results, which is directly related to the parties’ desire to support 
biodiversity research. 
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4.3.2.1 Special ABS Provisions for Researchers  
Proposals for special rules for research are both important and challeng-
ing. The CBD and its Parties and delegates have been keenly aware of the 
importance of research to the achievement of all three of the primary ob-
jectives of the Convention. Because of its importance in the context to 
academic and taxonomic research, the research sector is the group of 
users most directly affected by national access controls.44  
Many analysts have noted that research and researchers are very different 
from other users of genetic resources, and that the types of ‘benefits aris-
ing from utilization of genetic resources’, differ in many ways from bene-
fits arising from commercial development.45 CBD countries are generally 
able to recognize ‘benefits arising’ when they have concrete commercial 
value (products developed and produced, marketing permits, profits re-
ceived, formal intellectual property rights filed and/or granted) a type of 
benefits which are generally not created by the researcher directly. 
‘Research results’ may arise at a much earlier stage, and take a different 
form (e.g., the samples themselves may be a research result, as may taxo-
nomic identification, substance extraction, and other initial activities). 
In a larger sense, however, it is difficult to separate researchers from 
other users. In fact, every utilisation of a genetic resource begins with 
some type of research, often initially undertaken with no commercial pro-
spects or intent.46 A provision granting special status for ‘non-commercial 
researchers’ must include a reliable basis for identifying which recipients 
are researchers and which are ‘other users’. Specifically, a ‘non-commer-
cial research’ provision must clearly and objectively determine (i) which 
persons qualify as ‘non-commercial researchers’ (to ensure that the spe-
cial provisions cannot be abused by persons outside the target group) 
(ii) what requirements will still be imposed on researchers,47 and 
(iii) whether the research exception shall be agreed and adopted by all 
CBD countries or decided at the national level (and posted in the CHM.)  
A critical difference relates to the duration of the researcher’s special 
status. In some discussions, researcher status is an ‘absolute’ protection 
(that is, it applies to remove the researcher-collected genetic resources 
from the ABS system entirely); in others, it is a temporary condition, and 
the researcher or his genetic resources will lose that special status when/if 
the material is used for commercially developed. Two CBD countries, 
Bulgaria and Australia, have adopted special systems for researchers.48 
Both provisions apply self-selection criteria. The Bulgarian system 
creates an absolute protection; while the Australian system is based on 
‘utilization’.  
4.3.2.2 Sharing Research Results 
The duty to share in ‘the results of research and development’, if un-
equivocal, could mean that the source country has a right to all data 
(whether preliminary and analyzed), public or not. This is not a small 
matter. From the perspective of the provider, it has two competing as-
pects. On one hand access to data could enable a technically capable 
developing country to participate more competitively in technical indus-
tries and even in global commerce involving the use of genetic resources. 
On the other hand, the publication of data by a ‘non-commercial’ re-
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searcher may transfer that data to a commercial user, who may then 
utilise it without PIC and MAT.49 If a country cannot easily exploit its 
own genetic resources, it can obtain value from a new genetic-resource 
discovery only by keeping that discovery secret, until it obtains a benefit 
share or an ABS contract. Once the discovery and its properties are 
known, the would-be buyer will have no reason to continue to deal with 
the provider country. 50  
For the researcher, a duty to share preliminary and unanalyzed data af-
fects the exclusivity of his information. If forced to share proprietary data 
at this stage he may lose trade-secret protection of that data, particularly 
if the provider government agency is not able to guarantee that it can 
keep the data secret. For commercial research, the loss of trade-secrecy 
may put his proprietary data in the hands of competitors. An academic 
researcher may lose the credit for his discoveries.  
4.4 Contractual Implementation 
Prior to 2009, the role of contracts and the application of contract law in 
ABS has not been studied in detail. Recent analysis attempting to rigor-
ously study the ABS contracts and identify best practices, has discerned 
that relatively little information is available regarding the provisions of 
ABS Contracts and their impact.51 Of the fewer than 80 contracts that 
could be gathered, only 55 were provided with permission to share or 
publish their contents. Of the contracts reviewed, relatively few were 
examples of a formal contract or other instrument between a commercial 
entity and a provider of genetic resources: 
Table 3: Contracts publicly available 
ABS Contracts (user's or middleman's contract with provider or source country 35 
 - ABS Contracts designed as ‘Material Transfer Agreements’ (transferring physical samples 
 only) 7  
- ABS Contracts defining the ‘res’ as fully or partly intangible (information)  28 
‘Downstream Contracts’ (original collector or his transferee transfering or licensing material to 
other users researchers and/or transferees) 33 
‘Domestic’ contracts (user/recipient acquired genetic resources from its own country and used 
them within that country) 7 
Seed multiplication contract 1 
Repatriation contract (drafted as non-binding MOU) 1 
Total   79 
 This lack of data has made it difficult to discern best practices, affecting 
the ABS regime process in two ways. First, it limits the ability of the 
authors or other experts to undertake comprehensive legal analysis of 
ABS contracts. Formal contract law is over 5000 years old and is built on 
the record of millions, perhaps billions, of contracts. One cannot make 
legally valid determinations about the new aspect of contract law (the law 
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of ABS contracts) on the basis of only 80 examples. For the same reason, 
the lack of available data places certain limits on the ability of legal 
experts to draft models and other provisions with any certainty.  
4.4.1 Contractual Certainty 
One of the most basic principles of contract law is that a contract is legal-
ly ‘enforceable’52 only where it is ‘sufficiently definite’.53 A concept that 
is interpreted differently from country to country, it should be possible 
for the ABS negotiators to identify standards and practices that are defin-
ite enough to meet the most demanding national law. Such a common 
base of data is essential, whether it takes the form of an agreed legal 
system, or separate legal provisions adopted in each country and made 
available through the CHM or other appropriate mechanism.  
The minimum goal of such standards and practices should be to establish 
seven key certainties that must be pinned down for every contract, whose 
parties intend it to be legally enforceable: 
 What must be certain: 
First certainty 
Who owns the genetic resource, including:  
   - who has the right to grant access to the genetic resource;  
   - who has the right to give permission to utilise the genetic resource; and  
   - who has the power to decide how benefits will be shared 
and how this information can be known/determined. 
Second 
certainty The rights of each person who has an interest in the genetic resource  
Third certainty Who (what person or entity) is bound as the user under the contract, , and what right or power he will 
obtain by complying with ABS access requirements 
Fourth 
certainty 
At what point does the ABS agreement and/or, PIC/MAT become ‘final’ for purposes of contract law, 
including explanation of  
Fifth certainty  What it means in the country to have a ‘final’ ABS contract (i.e., may the ‘final’ contract later be 
rescinded? Is it linked to some government permission that must remain in force? Etc.); 
Sixth certainty 
How and to what is the provider protected in cases in which a user violates the conditions of his ABS 
contract/permit (i.e., through general provisions for legal redress, contractual guarantee/security, or other 
insurance). 
Seventh 
Certainty 
How source countries and other providers can know of, recognise or identify user-violations of the basic 
ABS requirements, including violations of source country law as well as instance of noncompliance with 
ABS contracts. 
Certainties (3) and (5) are normally addressed in contractual agreement. 
Certainties (6) and (7) are also partially addressed by contract. The 
regime negotiations can aid in developing these certainties by developing 
consensus about them, tools for their application, and guidance and 
capacity-building identifying the best contractual and scientific practices 
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relevant to contract oversight. While it might be best to agree on these 
matters as part of the negotiations, it is also possible to agree on their 
future development. 
By contrast, the answers to certainties (1), (2), (4), (6) and (7) are matters 
normally addressed by law in each country. It is not likely that most CBD 
countries will change their basic contract law, but they can determine (by 
legislative action, official interpretation or in some other way) what the 
law provides relevant to ABS matters (property ownership and rights, 
relevant administrative and governmental matters) and they can make this 
information available through the CHM.54 
At the same time, it is critical for all CBD countries to consider their 
realistic ability to control the acquisition and use of those ‘sovereign’ 
genetic resources (i.e., to answer the question ‘How does the regime pre-
vent users who do not comply with the ABS requirements from using 
genetic resources and/or from obtaining any user-incentive that is linked 
to the ABS regime?’) It may be better to adopt a regime which helps to 
guide the ‘good actors’ (users who comply with national ABS legislation 
and contracts) than to press for rights which the CBD countries cannot 
exercise.  
4.4.2 The Role of ‘Industry Standards’  
‘Industry standards’ are an important concept under contract law that may 
in future be a useful tool for ABS. In general, contract law recognises an 
‘industry standard’ where a particular industry or sector’s practices have 
become very well known and consistent throughout that industry or sec-
tor A recognised industry standard is often treated as contract law, unless 
the court, arbitrator or parties explicitly state that the industry standard is 
inequitable or illegal or otherwise should not be enforced in a particular 
contract.55 
This practice may have advantages for both sides of ABS. Industry stand-
ards could streamline the ABS process, and eliminate some of the critical 
legal and evidentiary obstacles that inhibit ABS compliance actions. At 
the same time, commercial users would have the ability to shape the ABS 
concept by promoting its application in a consistent way throughout their 
industry or sector. In this way they could be recognised as positive 
contributors to the CBD’s ability to meet its objectives.  
In order for an industry’s practices to become ‘standards’, however, they 
must, at a minimum, become well known. For ABS, the desire to have 
recognised industry standards could create an incentive for commercial 
users to be more open about the contents of their contracts.  
4.5 Determining the End Point of the ABS Relationship 
To the user, the value of genetic resources will diminish greatly if there is 
no clear end to the user’s obligations relating to genetic resources. The 
value of the genetic resource may diminish, if the user is bound to an 
eternal obligation to make payments to the source country or provider. 
The terminus of the benefit-sharing obligation has not been discussed 
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directly. It has been indirectly addressed in three ABS discussions: 
(i) contract fulfilment, (ii) transfers of genetic resources and 
(iii) ‘derivatives’ of genetic resources.  
4.5.1 Contract Fulfilment:  
As in every other aspect of ABS, the regime functions best in situations 
where the user has obtained an ABS contract through the application of 
the provider country’s PIC and MAT requirements. In general, a well 
drafted contract will provide clear indications of when and how one will 
know that the particular requirements of the contract have been fulfilled 
and are no longer ‘live’ requirements. If properly drafted, such provisions 
are fully enforceable. 
4.5.2 Transfers of Genetic Resources to Third Parties:  
Practically speaking, a transfer of genetic resources effectively ends the 
benefit-sharing relationship, unless the transferor takes two key steps: (1) 
transfers his contractual and legal ABS duties along with the transferred 
resources and (2) formally informs the provider and/or source country of 
the transfer in a way that puts the transferee in direct relationship with 
them. In practice, users who obtain genetic resources from researchers, 
collections, taxonomists and even middlemen often assume that they have 
no benefit-sharing responsibilities, because they did not directly collect 
the resources in the source country.56  
4.5.3 ‘Derivatives’ and ‘Products’ of Genetic Resources  
Although the CBD does not mention or define ‘derivatives’ or ‘products’ 
the terms have increasingly arisen in the ABS discussions. Unfortunately, 
up to now the persons discussing these issues have utilised very different 
meanings of the term derivatives, for example:57 
• One group considers ‘derivatives’ to refer to ‘material that is later 
bred, cultivated, or otherwise generated through some multiplication 
process in the user country’; 
• Others use the term to mean meta-extracts, fractions or essences ob-
tained from a plant, animal or other sample; 
• A third meaning refers to a product or commodity that is created 
utilizing the genetic resource – which may be used in the develop-
ment of further products, innovations or benefits.  
The ‘derivatives’ controversy appears to stem from provider concerns 
that terms like ‘access’ and ‘genetic resources’ do not cover all relevant 
ABS activities, or can too easily be avoided. This suggests a need either 
(i) to agree on a single meaning of ‘derivative’ in the ABS context, or (ii) 
to utilise an alternative approach. For example, the current controversies 
might be circumvent-able in an externally verifiable system, such as one 
built on a clear list or standard defining the activities that utilize genetic 
resources (see sections 4.1.2 and 7.1.2.3). It would not be necessary to 
resolve the derivatives controversy, since each use whether direct or 
through another interim product would be separately evaluated as a possi-
ble ‘utilization of genetic resources’.  
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4.6 Compliance: Remedies and Processes  
As detailed elsewhere,58 remedies and redress pose significant legal chal-
lenges for ABS, and for lawyers trying to help design the ABS regime. In 
a nutshell, although international (cross-boundary) contracts are not easy 
to enforce, they can be enforced, as long as they were carefully drafted as 
enforceable contracts. By contrast, there are very few existing (but gen-
erally unsatisfactory) options for provider countries seeking to enforce 
their national ABS legislation against users outside of the source country.  
As shown by the case study in Chapter 6, there are three primary compli-
ance situations: 
• The parties have agreed to MAT in the form of an instrument that 
can be applied and enforced as a ‘contract’;  
• The parties have agreed to MAT in some form that is not enforceable 
under another country’s contract law; or  
• The user has not complied with ABS requirements of the provider 
country. 
These three situations are very different in impact.59 Ultimately, ABS 
success is still a function of willingness to collaborate, rather than 
command-and-control-style legal mandate. Beyond this, it is often ex-
tremely difficult for foreign parties to effectively utilise the legislative, 
administrative and arbitration processes of any other country. There may 
be a need to develop guidance, technical assistance programmes or an 
ombudsman to assist providers and source countries seeking to protect 
their ABS rights and enable a better mechanism for applying conven-
tional remedies to ABS claims.  
4.6.1 Model and Default Clauses 
As noted in 4.2 above, a primary challenge where the parties have entered 
into an ABS contract arises when they find out that their contract is not 
enforceable, either generally or under the unique provisions of a certain 
country’s law. The Paris Annex offers two possible mechanisms that 
might help address that problem –model and ‘default’ clauses.  
4.6.1.1 Model Clauses: Assistance to Contract Parties Negotiating 
Enforceable Contracts 
Model instruments (that is instruments that are not mandatory, but may 
be used) may be very useful to parties negotiating ABS contracts. If 
parties’ to ABS contracts are willing to use such clauses, that use would 
increase the regularity of ABS practices (begin the process of defining 
‘industry standards’, see 4.4.2) without using any kind of compulsion or 
mandatory provisions. That willingness might be increased, where all 
CBD countries in the regime specifically state that agreed ‘model claus-
es’ are automatically valid and enforceable in their respective national 
courts. 
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4.6.1.2 Default Clauses: Binding the Parties to a de facto Contract 
The idea of ‘default clauses’ takes a giant step past model-clauses, stating 
that each country’s user-side law would apply the ‘default requirements’ 
to any user, unless that user could prove that he had received a valid ABS 
contract or complied with national requirements. As noted in 4.4, under 
contract law, no person or entity can be bound to a contract to which 
he did not actually agree unless it is specifically imposed by the law 
of his country. Given that user country law could not bind the provider 
country, default clauses adopted unilaterally by one or more user coun-
tries would be unenforceable in most cases.60 The only way to make them 
work would be for all CBD countries to agree to them as part of the ABS 
regime.  
To enable functionality, however, default clauses would have to exceed 
the minimum standard of legal enforceability in every country that is or 
might become a Party to the CBD. They must also contained sufficient 
information to enable agencies, courts or arbitrators to implement them. 
They must include at minimum answers to a number of critical questions 
relevant to enforcement of the law, including the following: 
• How shall the CBD countries identify users who are potentially in 
violation of ABS law? (e.g., by 
– complaint by provider or provider country? 
– oversight by user country? 
– watchdog NGOs? 
– ombudsman? 
– patent filings and other IPR applications? and formal inquiry or 
request for information from all applicants whose IPR relates to 
material of biological origin? 
– scrutiny of other legal filings, such as market permits, export 
permits, etc.? 
• What standard must/may be used by the user-country’s authorised 
agency to determine whether to bring the case? 
• What obligation, if any, does the user country owe to the provider, 
where a user has violated provider ABS law or the minimum require-
ments under the default clauses? 
• What country or countries will be deemed ‘provider(s)’ in cases 
where the user cannot or will not document the source of the genetic 
resources? 
• Will the application and contents of the default clauses be different 
or differently applied to specific users and sectors? 
• What evidence will be sufficient, if the user seeks to  
– prove (document) that he has complied with the ABS law of the 
provider country? (see 4.7, and note that the answer to this 
question would provide a basis for determining what specific 
instrument would be needed in a ‘certificate of ABS compli-
ance’ or a ‘certificate of legal provenance’.) 
 Balancing Building Blocks of a Functional ABS System 27 
 
– prove the specific provider country of all genetic resources he 
has used;61 How will the user’s equitable benefit-sharing obliga-
tion be quantified? (see 4.3 and 5.2) 
• How will benefit-sharing be collected following a judgment or deci-
sion that the user must share benefits?62 
• How will benefit-sharing be distributed in that case? 63 
The value of default clauses as an incentive depends on whether they set 
a ‘minimum agreed requirement’ or a ‘higher-than-normal obligation’. If 
the amount to be charged and the terms of performance are sufficiently 
large and difficult, and if it is relatively certain that the user-country court 
or arbitrator will assess them, they may constitute an incentive for the 
user to comply with national requirements. If not, they may operate as a 
perverse incentive, encouraging users to remove genetic resources ‘infor-
mally’ and wait and see if any action is ever taken.  
4.6.2 Other Mechanisms for Dealing with Users Who Have no Valid 
ABS Contract 
In any field, a national law that calls for implementation, application or 
enforcement of another country’s national legislation is very difficult or 
impossible to enforce effectively. A variety of practical legal obstacles 
prevent enforcement.64 In ABS, the simplest way (legally speaking65) to 
avoid this type of problem would be for all CBD countries to identify 
specific legal and illegal acts in the same way. In socio-cultural and poli-
tical terms, however, this is rarely possible. Failing that, alternative 
mechanisms for enforcement can be attempted. The legislative challenge 
will be to clearly identify the issues and situations covered by the solu-
tion, and the mechanism (specific contents of the law) that the parties will 
apply across borders. 
Key challenges under cross-border enforcement treaties include the need 
to know exactly what the relevant laws say, to ensure that any future 
amendments to the law will be consistent with the treaty, and to ensure 
that each country’s law contains all the requirements and provisions 
necessary to make it enforceable in the other country. Where the two 
countries use different official languages, it will be necessary to find 
some way for each judge to understand the precise contents of the other 
country’s law and of other relevant national law for purposes of legal 
interpretation of these laws and application to particular fact situations.66  
In light these problems, it would be impossible, as a practical matter, for 
191 CBD countries to legislatively state that they will apply all other 
CBD countries’ ABS law. Hence, where the user has not obtained legally 
valid contract with the authorised provider or provider country, it would 
probably be impossible to take direct action against the user in the user 
country, unless the ‘default clauses’ approach can be accepted and imple-
mented by all parties.67  
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4.6.3 Unknown and Undisclosed Origin of Genetic Resources 
The above ABS compliance solutions can only apply where the origin of 
the genetic resources is known, disclosed or undisputed. This is not al-
ways possible. For example, the records regarding the precise location of 
species collection may not be clear or the national jurisdiction over the 
area may be disputed. It is also possible that the user might answer ‘I 
don’t know’ to the question ‘Where do genetic resources used come 
from?’ Cases of disputed or unknown origin may pose a legal challenge 
relating to the ‘seven certainties’ (see 4.4.1), even where the user has an 
ABS contract with some person.  
The primary challenge for user countries in ‘unknown source’ cases is the 
mechanism for identifying defaulting users. Even with direct knowledge 
of who the user is, the provider has limited means of knowing what he is 
doing, relying primarily on the user’s good faith to keep them informed 
and make payments when due. Where the user is not known to the 
provider both provider and user countries have even less ability to identi-
fy potential companies or laboratories utilising genetic resource. It would 
be extremely costly to attempt to determine this through random inspec-
tions.  
Once the ‘unknown users’ are found and proven, two other challenges 
must be addressed – collection and distribution of a ‘benefit-share’ from 
those persons. For the first of these challenges, the nature and size of the 
benefit-share collected must be decided by some mechanisms or penalty 
schedule. As to the second challenge (benefit distribution) an obvious 
prototype mechanism is found in the ITPGRFA, where benefit-shares are 
paid into an international fund and then distributed among developing 
countries through a mechanism to be agreed in future. This process has 
not yet begun to function.68  
4.7 Certificates and other Monitoring and Communication 
Tools to Support Compliance 
The Paris Annex recognises that inter-governmental communications 
may form a critical obstacle to ABS compliance. Considered ‘diplomatic’ 
matters, and controlled by a high level of bureaucratic oversight in most 
countries,69 direct communication between agencies of two different 
countries can be very complicated. Normally, direct communication may 
only be permitted where the countries involved have agreed to an inter-
national communication mechanism.70 In ABS, compliance related com-
munication could occur through one or more agreed ‘certificates’; how-
ever, it is important to ensure that each specific certificate meets three 
practical criteria: 
• It must contain all necessary information needed to support judicial, 
administrative or arbitral action in the country receiving the 
certificate; 
• It must not require information that is not necessary to the specific 
purpose of the certificate; and 
• It must be signed and verified by an official whose level of responsi-
bility and oversight is sufficient to support judicial, administrative or 
arbitral action in the country receiving the certificate. 
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To date, discussions of the ‘ABS certificate’ have not yet been able to 
particularise their requirements to the particular situation in which the 
certificate will be used. When considering the communication needs of 
the ABS regime, it seems clear that a variety of different certificates may 
be needed, in order to provide a simplified mechanism of providing basic 
evidence in ABS compliance situations. 71 
4.8 Incentives 
If ABS is to depends entirely on formal oversight and enforcement by the 
source countries, user countries, NGOs and/or private claimants, it will be 
very unwieldy, and possibly unworkable. Internationally agreed and/or 
nationally adopted incentives and motivational measures72 could encour-
age user participation in and compliance with ABS.73 The success of such 
measures depends on many factors. They are normally most successful 
when the value of the reward, as perceived by the user, is much greater 
than the cost of compliance. For most governments, the problem with 
incentive systems is that the government does not have money or value to 
‘pay’ the incentive directly. Consequently, the most common types of in-
centives would be either indirect (e.g., tax exemptions for users who par-
ticipate in ABS) or market-based (creation of a certification for products 
that are ‘ABS compliant’).  
The ‘market’ mentioned in ‘market-based incentives’ may be the retail 
market, but may also be the resource market,74 financial/lending market, 
or the ‘market’ for foreign aid and technical assistance contracts.75 Incen-
tive systems of this type aim for varying levels of success. Forest 
certification systems are a well-known effort to create incentives for 
compliance with environmental standards. Although there are a large 
number of such systems, the total acreage of forests participating in all 
such systems combined does not yet reach 20% of all commercially 
usable forests. By contrast, government land registry systems, which are 
often non-mandatory, are used in more than 95% of land transactions in 
countries which have such registries. The primary factor determining the 
success rate is the user’s perception of the value of the reward (incentive 
or motivation).76  
Even where there is no specific reward offered, however, completely vol-
untary measures have proven effective where the measures are desired by 
the regulated industry (such as where the industry recognizes a need to 
act in a more coherent way, but requires government’s help and guidance 
to do so, or where an industrial sector agrees to voluntary measures in 
order to prevent the government from adopting restrictive legislation.)77 
To date, voluntary measures have been developed successfully to govern 
ABS-related actions of ex-situ biological collections (which are primarily 
‘middlemen’, although also engaging in taxonomic and other research.) 
Numerous ongoing efforts have created or are creating ABS voluntary 
measures with regard to botanic gardens,78 microorganism collections,79 
and sourcing biological materials from rural and indigenous groups.80  
Incentives and motivation measures place the onus of responsibility on 
the user, not by mandate, but by self-interest. The user will comply if it 
wants to receive the benefit. Although they do not completely eliminate 
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the need for governmental oversight,81 incentives eliminate the need to 
inspect and compel individual users. In a functional system, users recog-
nize that if they comply with the requirements, they will receive the ‘re-
ward’; but otherwise they will not.  
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5 Support for Functionality 
The Paris Annex identifies two other types of measures that might pro-
vide essential supports to functionality. 
5.1 Awareness Raising 
In general, the CBD’s provisions regarding awareness raising are ex-
pressed as political objectives and recommendations for domestic action 
by a country for the benefit of its own citizens and communities.82 The 
current provisions in the Paris Annex are written in a similar vein. As 
such, although very important, they do not have direct impact on regime 
functionality and will not be examined in this action-paper.  
It is important, however, to consider the possible linkage between aware-
ness raising and the acceptance and use of voluntary and incentive mea-
sures, as discussed in 4.8. For example, international social responsi-
bility/environmental certification systems (such as those developed under 
the Forest Stewardship Council or Fair Trade©) have been most success-
ful when they are ‘market based’.83 In turn, market-based incentive 
systems are only successful where the ‘market’ is aware of and support-
ive of the objectives of the incentive. Consequently, awareness of ABS 
issues may have a significant impact on the functionality of any com-
ponent of ABS which operates fully or partly through incentives and 
other motivation mechanisms. 
5.2 Equity and Equality: Transactional Assistance for 
Traditional and Rural Providers  
The imperative that benefit-sharing shall be ‘fair and equitable’ has been 
less explored in literature and ABS discussions. Normally, where parties 
have freely agreed to a contract in fair negotiations, it is assumed to be, 
fair and equitable by definition. This, however, can be challenged as there 
are standards in national legal systems which implement equity principles 
as substantive law. The Paris Annex speaks of promoting equality among 
parties,84 but focuses on a limited aspect of this issue – the need for 
special assistance to rural communities and other providers during ABS 
negotiations.  
In this connection, one must begin by noting that ABS is an undisputedly 
complex subject.85 As a result, in transactions between commercial enti-
ties and rural communities or individuals, the former often experience 
high levels of uncertainty regarding the capacity of the rural individuals 
or communities to effectively negotiate in their own interests. In many 
cases the communities or rural individuals themselves feel similar mis-
givings. This uncertainty poses a significant risk that an administrator or 
judge could find that the commercial entity had exerted an unfair level of 
control in the contractual negotiations, due to the rural parties’ lack of 
commercial and legal sophistication. If a court were to make such a find-
ing, the result may be in a very unfavourable decision on the overall 
claim – rescinding the rights granted to the commercial entity and/or 
ordering remedies in favour of the rural community.  
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6 Functionality of User-side Approaches 
In a previous study, published in 2007, the authors thoroughly examined 
the then-current situation relative to the adoption of user-side measures 
for applying and enforcing any type of legal vehicle regulating ABS 
aspects, law or contracts, finding very few actual user-side measures 
adopted in any country. Returning to this question in 2009, this situation 
has changed very little. This result may not be surprising, as it reflects the 
very serious legal obstacles faced by most developed countries when try-
ing to address user-side obligations as currently stated in Article 15 and 
in the Bonn Guidelines. 
In this connection, Norway and Japan stand as exception. Norway is one 
of the very countries to adopt formal legislative provisions clearly impos-
ing any user-side obligations, while Japan has adopted and implemented a 
non-binding solution to good effect.  
6.1 Recent Developments in Norwegian User-side Measures  
Recently, in its new Nature Diversity act, Norway has implemented an 
interesting general rule entitled ‘Genetic material from other Countries’, 
along with disclosure requirements in the patent act and the plant variety 
protection act. The next sections discuss this new enactment, and its 
potential application as a tool for interpretation and enforcement of the 
ABS regime.  
6.1.1 Norway’s Laudable Legislative Efforts to Meet Its Obligations 
under Article 15.7: The Norwegian Nature Diversity Act 
The Nature Diversity Act specifically recognises that the main entity re-
sponsible for regulating access and benefit sharing is the providing coun-
try. The supporting preparatory document prepared by the Ministry expli-
citly states that ‘these measures [provided in the act] do not alone fully 
solve the challenge of meeting the obligation of fair and equitable benefit 
sharing’,86 clearly recognizing that these measures requiring support in 
other legal and political tools, and calling on providing countries to 
provide the needed supplementary tools at the international level. 
Although it considered including a specific statement of the obligation to 
share benefits; the Ministry of Environment determined that the Act did 
not need such a clause, leaving to the providing countries’ responsibility 
to require benefit sharing.87 The supporting preparatory document also 
emphasises the need for controlling the right to use the material either at 
the time of use or at the time of commercialisation rather than the time of 
access, recognising that a utilisation approach is the most practical and 
enforceable of the regime-framework options. For purposes of functional 
user-side implementation of ABS, the most relevant provision of the Act 
is § 60: 
Import of genetic material for exploiting of genetic material to 
Norway, from a state which requires prior informed consent to use 
or export, can only happen in compliance with such consent. The 
one having genetic material in hand is bound by the conditions and 
limitations for the consent. The State/government can enforce the 
conditions and limitations, including by court-cases, pro-bono of 
the other country having established those criteria.88 
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This paragraph places the trigger of Norway’s actual implementation on 
the two main substantive facts: import of genetic material requiring PIC; 
and Norway’s expectation that its courts and agencies will directly apply 
the terms and conditions set by the provider country. Although a huge 
step forward in ABS implementation, this approach has two unaddressed 
weaknesses: 1) It creates a level of uncertainty for Norwegian users and 
decision-makers, given that access legislation will vary among countries, 
creating legal uncertainty as to whether and how each country’s provider 
side law will be legally transferred to the Norwegian legal situation; and 
2) there is no specified minimum level for a share of benefits which will 
be recognised as ‘fair and equitable.’ As to the latter, the Act apparently 
assumes that Norwegian law will apply to determine the benefit-share in 
cases involving no compliance with provider-side law, as well as 
situations in which the ABS contract might be subject to challenge as 
‘inequitable’ under Norwegian law. 
Most important, the act establishes procedural competence for the Nor-
wegian ‘State/government’ to ‘enforce the conditions and limitations’. 
This rule is a major addition to the former legal situation in Norway 
relating to ABS.89 It gives the government specific competence to enforce 
either a contract or a national legal requirement of another country in the 
legal system of Norway.  
Even if the import of the genetic material is not legally challenged, the 
second paragraph of this provision extends the user’s substantive 
obligation to the time when genetic material is ‘utilised’: 
When genetic material from another country is used in Norway for 
research or commercial purposes, the material shall be accompan-
ied by information identifying the country from which the genetic 
material is received or collected (providing country). Where the 
providing country requires prior informed consent, information 
documenting such consent shall also follow the material.90 
This presumption that genetic material may be followed by an informa-
tional ‘passport’ indicates that the government views ‘genetic resources’ 
as a physical resource, rather than an informational resource. The Act 
does not currently specify any consequences for a user who does not meet 
this passport obligation.  
A third section of the article extends the obligations specified above also 
to cover the situation where genetic resources have passed through multi-
ple hands, since they were removed from the country of origin: 
If the providing country is not the [a] country of origin for the gen-
etic material, then information regarding the country of origin shall 
also be disclosed. ‘Country of origin’ means the country where the 
material was found or accessed in its natural habitat. If the national 
law of the country of origin requires prior informed consent for 
access to genetic material, the disclosure shall contain information 
about whether such PIC has been received. If the information dealt 
with in this paragraph (section) is unknown, this fact also shall be 
stated.91  
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The last sentence implements an obligation to explicitly note whether the 
information is unknown. When lack information is made illegal through a 
general obligation to give correct information, it makes sense to also 
establish a duty to state the negative. 
Additional clauses address traditional knowledge by granting a general 
right for the government, the King, to expand these obligations of keep-
ing information available also to cover traditional knowledge. The Act 
also notes that special rules apply in the case of PGRFA: 
The King (government) may adopt supplementary regulations, 
regarding the disclosure of information in cases in which the utili-
sation of genetic material also utilises local peoples or indigenous 
peoples traditional knowledge.92 
For material which is covered by the scope of the ITPGRFA, it 
shall be accompanied by information about the acquisition of the 
material in compliance with the SMTA of the MS.93 
6.1.2 Norway’s Disclosure Requirement in the Patent Act 
In addition to the new Nature Diversity Act, Norway has implemented a 
disclosure obligation in the patent act:  
Section 8 b. If an invention concerns or uses biological material, 
the patent application shall include information on the country 
from which the inventor collected or received the material (the 
providing country). If it follows from the national law in the 
providing country that access to biological material shall be 
subject to prior consent, the application shall state whether such 
consent has been obtained.  
If the providing country is not the same as the country of origin of 
the biological material, the application shall also state the country 
of origin. The country of origin means the country from which the 
material was collected from its natural environment. If the national 
law in the country of origin requires that access to biological 
material shall be subject to prior consent, the application shall state 
whether such consent has been obtained. If the information set out 
in this subsection is not known, the applicant shall state that.  
The duty to disclose information under the first and second 
paragraphs applies even where the inventor has altered the 
structure of the received material. The duty to disclose information 
does not apply to biological material derived from the human 
body.  
Breach of the duty to disclose information is subject to penalty in 
accordance with the General Civil Penal Code § 166. The duty to 
disclose information is without prejudice to the processing of 
patent applications or the validity of rights arising from granted 
patents.94 
The required disclosures under Norwegian Patent Act involve several 
different and complementary types of information: 
• The providing countries from which the inventor received or collec-
ted the material; 
• If prior informed consent (PIC) is required in the providing country, 
information about the existence of such consent should be included; 
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• The country of origin, if different from the providing country; 
• If prior informed consent (PIC) is required in the country of origin, 
information about the existence of such consent should be included; 
• In all four cases, if the required information is not known, the 
applicant shall include a statement about the lack of information in 
the application 
Interestingly, the focus of this obligation is on biological material – not 
genetic resources, as in CBD article 15.7. It is triggered if the providing 
country is not the same as the country of origin.95 The Act does not 
require the applicant to make the PIC available or to document legality to 
the material, the obligations are met if the information is enclosed in the 
application. Similarly, there is no actual benefit-sharing obligation stated 
in the Act. Most important, if the listed information is not known to the 
patent applicant, the applicant need only include a statement to this effect 
in the application. In the case of a false statement, the applicant is subject 
to penalty under article §166 in the Norwegian Penal Code.  
The obligations in the Patent Act do not solve any of the key procedural 
issues and they do not create by itself a functional ABS-system. Its 
contribution lies in providing information which then could hypothetical-
ly be used in an enforcement action. The disclosure requirement is trig-
gered wherever ‘an invention concerns or uses biological material’-- a 
very low threshold of dependency or similarity between the biological 
material and the invention. The Act goes on to specify that ‘these obliga-
tions […] apply also when the inventor has altered (or changed) the 
structure of the received material,’ underscoring the legislator’s desire to 
give broad scope to the rule, by including all genetic modification. These 
good intentions have not produced results, however, it is not always easy, 
from a practical-legal point of view, to prove that an invention ‘concerns 
or uses’ biological material. The challenge of applying and enforcing this 
obligation upon private parties may be very difficult to overcome, partic-
ularly where the evidentiary standards of the Penal Code apply to all such 
actions.  
The most significant reason that the Patent disclosure requirement does 
not contribute to functional ABS is the lack of consequences. As noted in 
the Act, the consequence of not meeting the disclosure obligation is left 
outside the patent system: ‘Non-compliance with the disclosure 
obligation has no effect for the proceeding of the patent application 
or the validity of a granted patent.’96 Failure to provide information 
according to the Patent Act § 8b is not a sufficient basis for penalty. 
Under the Penal Code (§ 166):  
Any person who gives false testimony in court or before a notary 
public or in any statement presented to the court by him as a 
party to or legal representative in a case, or who orally or in 
writing gives false testimony to any public authority in a case in 
which he is obliged to give such testimony, or where the testimony 
is intended to serve as proof, shall be liable to fines or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. 
The same penalty shall apply to any person who causes testimony 
known to him to be false to be given by another person in any of 
the above-mentioned cases, or who aids and abets thereto. 
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Hence, failure to provide full and correct information is only a crime in 
the cases where the person has deliberately stated that the given informa-
tion is correct and complete.97 
In practice, a further limitation on the value of patent disclosure require-
ments as functionally effective user measures arises from their limited 
scope. These provisions apply only to patent applications addressed 
directly to the Norwegian Patent Office, and only when they were filee 
directly (not sent via the system under the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT), WIPO.)98 Since Norway joined the European Patent Organisation 
(EPO), the number of Norway-filed patents is expected to decline.  
6.2 An Alternative Approach in Japan: A Non-mandatory 
System of User Measures 
The longest experience with user measures of any country is that of Japan 
which has officially adapted the Bonn Guidelines for Japanese users and 
is formally implementing those guidelines. In 2005, the Japanese Minis-
try of Economy Trade and Industry (METI), in conjunction with the 
Japan Bioindustry Association, concluded a multi-year process through 
which they developed a set of guidelines for users of genetic resources 
(the ‘Japanese Guidelines’).99 Based on the Bonn Guidelines, the Japan-
ese Guidelines provide a set of basic principles and suggestions for users 
seeking to comply with best practices for ABS compliance. Two aspects 
of the Japanese Guidelines to stand out:  
• They are directly focused on the obligations of users; and  
• they include a direct incentive for users to comply with the guide-
lines (the Government offers direct assistance to any company that 
complies with the Guidelines and still encounters difficulty in obtain-
ing provider approval) 100 
The operation of the Japanese Guidelines in practice is not a theoretical 
matter. They have been used, and the Government has addressed them in 
individual situations. Those experiences, although confidential, provide 
an excellent example of the manner in which voluntary measures, backed 
by active support, can significantly contribute to ABS functionality.  
In essence, when the appropriate Ministry (the Ministry of Economy 
Trade and Industry (METI) is contacted by a provider (country or indi-
vidual) or otherwise discovers that there is discontent or negative publici-
ty in a developing country regarding the utilisation of genetic resources 
by a Japanese user (company or researcher), METI contacts the user and 
asks them to come in for a consultation, during which METI’s informa-
tion and analysis of the problem is communicated along with the benefits 
and advantages to the user of compliance with the Japanese Guidelines. 
Although the Guidelines are voluntary, this type of conference has result-
ed in compliance with the Guidelines and acceptance of METI’s view, in 
most or all cases to date.101  
Beyond this, Japan also has adopted a consultation system for users, 
through which they can obtain advice about implementing the Japanese 
Guidelines, in advance (before the user finalises his ‘access’ process). 
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This system is a natural partner to the ‘official’ conferences with METI in 
cases where a problem has arisen, but entirely separate from it – available 
through the government/private joint organisation, the Japan Bioindustry 
Association (JBIA). Since Japan’s adoption of the guidelines in 2005, 
JBIA has held over a hundred consultations of this type.102 This advisory 
process is linked to a series of bilateral processes at the governmental 
level, through which more specific information is agreed between Japan 
(often through JBIA) and the governments of some particular countries 
that Japanese users are interested in. This enables JBIA’s consultation 
process to be more specific regarding what is needed or desirable in each 
country.  
6.3 A Thought-Experiment: A Enforcing a Provider-side 
Legal ABS Vehicle in Norway 
In this section, we follow a thought-experiment, considering how an ABS 
claim would fare under Norwegian law. This discussion will be general, 
considering all of the ABS-vehicles described in section 4.2; and asking 
how a provider country could enforce each legal vehicle under the ABS 
provisions of the Norwegian Nature Diversity Act and Patent Act, de-
scribed above in the context of general Norwegian law. This discussion is 
designed to demonstrate the legal needs of the only country with a 
‘binding’ user-side requirement in its national law, and to show what the 
international regime negotiations might address to improve the ability of 
Norway to apply its user measures.  
The following discussion provides a practical legal point of view – that of 
an attorney of law in Norway preparing a case before the courts on behalf 
of a provider country. In other words: what would he need to apply the 
above user-side obligations before a court and to enforce them in a valid 
court decision? The legal vehicles followed in this though-experiment are 
the three following situations: (i) where the user has a formal ABS 
contract, but does not comply with that contract; (ii) where the providing 
country utilizes a different legal vehicle (administrative permit or other 
measure); and (iii) where a genetic resource is taken from a source 
country which has implemented a PIC-procedure, but there has been no 
approval.  
 6.3.1 Initial Awareness of a Potential Infringement 
The first challenge in Norway would be the need to become aware of a 
genetic resources being utilized in Norway. Neither of Norway’s genetic-
resource-related laws provides any guarantee that any relevant officials 
will become aware that its genetic resource is being utilized in Norway. 
Where the user has agreed to an ABS contract or other legal vehicle, the 
provider has an incentive (if not the ability) to examine or enquire into 
that user’s activities using of genetic resources. In the other two situa-
tions, neither the provider/source nor the Norwegian officials would 
necessarily be aware of who the users in Norway are. The use of a genetic 
resource has no obvious external verifiable manifestations which would 
be controllable by either government. The provider and/or source country 
could detect such use only (i) where the user’s contractual obligation 
which requires reporting back to the providing country and provides a 
38 Tomme R. Young and Morten Walløe Tvedt 
 
power of inspection, or (ii) where the Norway engaging in other over-
sight. If the user’s access was obtained using other types of provider-
country law (administrative permits, etc.), similar problems would arise. 
Where the private user has failed to comply with any provider-side legal 
vehicle or requirement, the user-side measure calling for information 
(e.g., Nature Diversity Act § 60) cannot compete with the perverse incen-
tive which encourages the private user not to disclose the origin of the 
material. This challenge cannot be resolved solely through national law in 
either the user or the provider country (unless they both have developed 
and adopted provisions with virtually identical scope, application, and 
criteria, and have agree to their ‘mutual enforcement’). current situation 
of law could therefore be improved if the CBD countries (or the specific 
countries in each individual ABS situation could agree on specific extern-
al criteria that determine which users are subject to concrete ABS mea-
sures (possibly including a means by which a user can demonstrate that 
he is not using genetic resources, and thus not subject to ABS require-
ments).  
If the law created a reason that users would affirmatively desire recogni-
tion as ABS-compliant entities, the Norwegian disclosure requirements 
could be very useful. It could operate to give both the user and the gov-
ernment a clear check-point at which to document their compliance and 
to inform the government about the provider country’s involvement. 
Even with such a check-point, however, the provider country would not 
be much closer to receiving its benefit-share from a defaulting user. The 
next critical step involves identifying and exhausting enforcement 
opportunities. 
6.3.2 Enforcement Outside the Court System 
Supposing that the provider or source country has overcome the chal-
lenge of identifying an ABS violator, he must next embark on the process 
of turning that information into legal enforcement of his right to a 
benefit-share. At this point, the user-side application issues relating to the 
three legal vehicles investigated start to diverge. 
Where the user has not complied with any legal vehicle, the provider or 
source country has only a few very limited administrative avenues for 
compelling the user to share benefits. The general provisions in the Nor-
wegian Nature Diversity Act requiring the user to keep a record of certain 
types of information, does not specifically state an obligation regarding 
sharing benefits with the provider or source country. Norwegian adminis-
trative public law requires that the Storting (the Parliament of Norway) 
clearly state such an obligation, before it can be legally binding upon 
persons or entities in Norway. The existing procedural requirement would 
not meet that standard. 
Where the user’s ABS rights were obtained by an administrative decision 
or other non-contractual compliance in the providing country, he could 
easily comply with the information-requirement; but again, could not be 
compelled to share benefits, for the same reason. 
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The provider or source country who has bound the user to a written ABS 
contract would have a clear advantage, here, since such a contract could 
easily be taken to the arbitration, mediation or other process. There is, 
however, no significant body of legal remedies where enforcement is 
sought outside the court system. In Norway one can complain to different 
types of ombudsmen about different aspects of legal challenges and 
equitable needs. The most general ombudsman in Norway deals with all 
kinds of complaints relating to the administrative branch of Norwegian 
government. He has no formal powers to enforce, however, nor even to 
find an administrative decision invalid. His competence is to look at the 
case with fresh-eyes and give a recommendation to the administrative 
unit either to change the result in that particular case or in their practice. 
An ombudsman could be given the resources to survey information and 
make such recommendations to the accused user of genetic resources. 
6.3.3 Taking the User to Court 
The next challenging step is to seek enforcement of any of the three legal 
vehicles in a Norwegian court: 
6.3.3.1 Access to Courts for Plaintiffs from another Country 
In order to seek legal action in court, the plaintiff must meet two general 
prerequisites, and must also define a ‘case’ or ‘cause of action’ on which 
a court can decide: 
• Personal competence: Section 2-1 of the Civil Process Act lists the 
entities which have ability to act before a court in Norway (parts-
evne). Although it is applicable to foreign legal persons, it does not 
mention other countries, and there are no indications that the govern-
ment of other states can use the court system of Norway on equal 
footing with Norwegian citizens. Indeed, the ability of organizations 
to have access to courts has been a dubious question in Norwegian 
law, addressed by various court cases. This case-law is now imple-
mented in the act §2-1(2), making it also difficult for an international 
NGO to take a Norwegian entity to court. 
• The object of the dispute: Under Norwegian law, ‘only judicial 
claims can be brought before by a court’.103 A claim is considered to 
be ‘judicial’ where it meets certain legal standards. For example, the 
claimant must justify a need for a judicial decision against this 
defendant.104 This requirement is much easier to meet where the 
claimant has a contractual instrument and can show a breach of con-
tractual terms. Where the user’s right is based on the user’s violation 
of a properly obtained provider-side administrative decisions or other 
legal vehicle, the legal justification for a claim is less obvious, and 
the result is much less certain. It appears nearly impossible to justify 
the use of Norwegian courts under this requirement, where the claim 
is based simply on the user’s violation of law with the laws of the 
providing country. These probable results emphasize the perverse in-
centives inherent in the ABS-system. 
Another requirement105 states that the legal person must have a suffi-
ciently close connection to the case; whose objective must be includ-
ed within their organization’s objective. This requirement would 
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probably prevent a Norwegian NGO from taking a Norwegian com-
pany to court with a provider country as the beneficiary to the court 
case. 
6.3.3.2 Cases based on the Nature Diversity Act § 60.1.3 
Where the case is brought under the Nature Diversity Act, the Norwegian 
government can enforce provider/source-country’s conditions and limita-
tions, including by court-cases, which are brought on behalf of that pro-
vider or source country. This Act specifically establishes that the Norwe-
gian government has a formal legal interest in ABS, a statement which 
enables the Government’s ABS actions to more easily meet the criteria 
for bringing an ABS case in Norwegian court. One open issue, which 
may be a limiting factor in this competence, arises from the ‘conditions 
and limitations’ language, which is not linked to legal vehicles. Uncer-
tainties about how this language will be applied suggest that it may be 
necessary to test the Government’s ability to apply it to all three types of 
legal vehicles.  
The process of granting foreign governments access to the Norwegian 
court system might sound like a relatively simple drafting principle. In 
fact, however, it is very difficult and controversial, because it cuts across 
basic principles of national sovereignty.106 Similarly, it would be difficult 
within Norway’s legal system to open the courts to whichever NGO 
wishes to raise an ABS issue in court, as this would be seen to have the 
potential of increasing the public’s appetite for dragging whichever 
question to the courtroom, and make it easier for them to do so. Also the 
strict criteria for a Norwegian NGO to take a national matter to court is 
rather limited; so the political possibilities to grant a more extensive right 
to foreign- or international NGOs would probably be limited. 
To better enable enforcement of any ABS legal vehicle by a Norwegian 
court, the national act on civil procedural must be adapted to identify and 
empower particular persons or officials taking care of ABS-issues. This 
provision must be adapted to each user-country’s court system. The ABS 
Working Group’s output could contribute to this process by specify-
ing which types of cases that should have cross-border access to the 
courts; perhaps providing (or calling on the CBD COP, ABS Govern-
ing Body or some expert body to provide) guidance on how non-
contract ‘legal vehicles’ can be created in a way that maximizes 
cross-border enforceability. 
6.3.3.3 Organization matters for institutions considering ABS claims 
One further issue may have a significant impact on ABS enforcement 
actions, the requirements imposed on persons seeking to represent a party 
to an ABS contract or other instruments in Norwegian court. Under these 
laws, an attorney who has not been certified to practice law in Norway 
must receive specific clearance before he may represent a client in a legal 
action. 
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6.3.3.4 Choosing the national venue of a court-case (international 
verneting)  
Beyond all of the above requirements, Norwegian law includes a basic 
provision of ‘private international law’.107 A dispute in an international 
matter can only be brought before a Norwegian court if the case has a 
link to Norway.108 This requirement can be difficult to satisfy, particularly 
in cases against a multinational company. These issues are clearest with 
regard to ABS contracts, where the case is brought under contract law.  
6.3.3.5 What Would the Court Do on the Substantial Questions? 
Substantive application of foreign law depends on many factors, includ-
ing the legal rules about what elements must be present to make a law or 
contract ‘enforceable’ (a valid legal basis for a court action), as well as 
how the court will interpret foreign legal instruments. 
• Enforceability/validity: A first question which would be relevant 
for the court would be to assess the validity of the provider side law 
or other legal ABS-vehicle which the claimant refers to as the legal 
basis for the claimed obligation. The question the court will ask is 
‘Does the law or legal vehicle used provide a basis for legal action in 
Norwary?’ If the vehicle used is an enforceable contract, this choice 
is simpler to answer. The answer is usually positive (the law of most 
countries will recognize and apply such a contract.) It must be 
remembered; however, that not every contract is ‘enforceable’, and 
that many countries have quite different standards for determining 
enforceability.109  
Regarding the two other legal-vehicle situations above, however, the 
answer is less clear. This question is currently not resolved by the 
Nature Diversity Act. If the court decides that the legal vehicle is a 
valid source of law, then the next question would be to what extent it 
is interpreted as a binding obligation upon the parties.  
• Interpretation and Application of foreign law: Upon concluding 
that the contract is valid and binding, the court’s next challenge 
would be to interpret it -- to identify the particular meaning of the 
legally binding obligations within it, and apply them to the facts of 
the particular case. Here the Norwegian court (and the parties in-
volved in a case before it) would face four additional concerns: 1) 
ABS is a unknown legal concept among judges in Norway, so there 
would be little understanding of the underlying rational for the legal 
vehicle which it is asked to enforce. 2) ABS will relate to technical 
questions of either biotechnology, gene-technology or a related 
technical field. Judges are trained in law and very seldom in biology 
or even less in these technical fields. This could be an obstacle for 
the court to conclude in a clear obligation upon the parties. 3) foreign 
laws are often written in official languages which judges cannot read 
directly. As a result, the judge will need to obtain a translation, 
which would probably be ‘unofficial’ meaning that the parties may 
raise significant challenges to the manner in which the translation 
conveys (or fails to convey) subtle concepts. 4) Foreign laws are 
often built on principles and legal approaches that are very different 
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from the basic legal approaches underlying the Norwegian legal sys-
tem. A judge is normally called upon to determine specific questions 
(the relevance of a specific phrase, the application of one party’s 
obligation following an unexpected event or change, etc.) which is 
not explicitly discussed in the law. In the provider country, this type 
of interpretation could often involve carefully parsing the details of 
the law and contract, applying other basic laws of the land, or even 
delving into the parties’ intentions, by examining particular actions 
or statements made by the parties during contract negotiations. It 
may be difficult for a Norwegian court to know which matters of 
provider-country law must be applied,110 and to find a basis for re-
solving the parties competing claims on these matters. 
If the court can overcome these difficulties of legal basis and interpre-
tation, it would be faced with more detailed challenges in applying the 
ABS law to the facts. If it is able to render a basic judgment, and finds 
that the user must share benefits, he may face even further challenges in 
setting and/or enforcing the benefit-sharing obligation. This question will 
typically face both legal and economical difficulties.  
The legal difficulties are different depending on which of the three situa-
tions is before the court. Where there is an enforceable contract, it is 
generally believed that the benefit-sharing and other payment and value-
transfer provisions.111 In most countries, including Norway, however, the 
courts are specifically obliged to determine if the contract’s provisions 
are fair and equitable before enforcing them. This requirement adds a 
level of doubt to the enforcement process, since not all countries use the 
same meanings and principles regarding equity in their national legal 
order.  
Where the court action relates to compliance with a different type of legal 
vehicle (administrative order or permit, for example) similar challenges 
arise. In particular, the administrative objectives underlying the permit 
contents may not be clearly stated in the document, increasing the diffi-
culty for a court trying to apply equitable principles to determine whether 
it can enforce the payment obligations under the permit. Finally, as noted 
above, in actions claiming that the user failed to obtain any legal approval 
(failure to comply with PIC and MAT) it will be difficult for any court to 
order specific benefit-sharing, without first obtaining the provider’s and/ 
or source country’s consent. Any such order would create a de facto 
contract. A Norwegian court could make such an order against the citi-
zens and entities under Norway’s jurisdiction, but normally force a party 
outside that jurisdiction to be bound by such a contract. This result is 
underscored by the CBD's separate requirement of MAT for benefit 
sharing. 
Apart from the legal questions, raised above, the court could also face 
economic challenges, particularly in cases involving the third hypotheti-
cal situation – i.e., cases in which the user did not comply with national 
ABS law, and has no ABS contract or permit. Lacking any agreement to 
guide the decision; and lacking information about how ABS contracts and 
courts have valued the resources in the past, the court will have to set 
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value using basic legal principles of the country. There will be a signifi-
cant level of uncertainty here for the claimant and the respondent. 
If all these difficulties are overcome, the court would be faced with yet 
another ‘legal personality’ question: ‘Who is legally entitled, as right-
holder to the benefits, to receive any payments?’ Normally, this question 
will be decided earlier in the legal action, because most courts have a 
basic rule that one person may not bring an action to enforce the rights of 
another. Hence, unless the action is technically brought by or in behalf of 
the actual right-holder, the case will not stand. At the time of the judg-
ment and its execution, the legal rights of a particular individual, com-
munity, entity or country must be clear – only the person(s) with a legal 
right may receive funds under the judgment. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the particular ‘owner’ of genetic resources within the provider country is 
decided by each country as a matter of sovereign right. As such, the legal 
status of genetic resources varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Unless 
the right-holder can be determined with certainty, however, no judgment 
may be given or enforced. This determination involves a broad variety of 
difficult legal issues requiring examination of both ‘ABS law’ and other 
law of the providing country (raising the same difficulties mentioned 
above). It would be even more complicated if the core of the dispute in-
volves customary law and its application.  
Assuming he has been notified, one might expect the ambassador of the 
provider country to become involved in this issue through the Foreign 
Minister of Norway (validating or refuting the right of the group appear-
ing before the Norwegian court.) Ultimately, if the Norwegian court 
chooses to decide this case, it would be forced to come to some (pre-
judicial or binding) decision regarding the legal status of the resources in 
the providing country. It is unlikely that a Norwegian court would be 
willing to embark on such a difficult task. Even if it did so, it would be 
difficult for the parties to predict that decision. In either case, this issue 
and process constitute an obstacle to the legal certainty.  
6.3.3.6 Limitations on the Verdict 
In order for a Norwegian court decision to be legally accepted, it must 
meet certain other requirements, as well. Its substantive content must be 
‘actual and concrete’ in a legal sense. Breach of contract is a simple and 
well-recognized issue, on which courts can easily issue a concrete verdict 
(damages or strict performance of the contract), suggesting that, in this 
aspect as well, the provider/source country are best protected where there 
is a formally enforceable ABS contract. Enforcement of foreign adminis-
trative and legal instruments may be less clear-cut in this respect, and 
where the provider/source claim that the user did not comply with ABS 
law at all, it is difficult to envision a way for a Norwegian court to formu-
late a verdict forcing a Norwegian citizen to comply with the law of the 
other country.  
In law practice, the duty to identify and propose an acceptable verdict 
rests with the claimant, would normally improve his chances by calling 
for payment of a concrete sum of money or performance of some equally 
certain action or compliance. In particular, a court decision in Norway 
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could hardly oblige a user to share research results with another entity, in 
light of existing rules on competition and trade secrets.  
6.3.3.7 Enforcement of a Decision from another Country 
In some cases, claimants may seek to avoid some of the uncertainties and 
challenges described above by obtaining the verdict on their claim in an-
other country (the provider country) and seeking enforcement in Norway. 
This avenue will also require the claimant to bring the request for en-
forcement as a court case in Norway. A great many issues may arise in 
such a case, as the court is normally required to determine whether the 
verdict is acceptable under Norwegian law. This determination raises 
many difficult questions, including those described above.  
If the verdict to be enforced was initially decided by a European Court, a 
difficult question arises under the Lugano Convention, which provides a 
variety of rules for determining whether such a decision could be 
enforced by a Norwegian court upon a Norwegian citizens. These rules 
have been examined in many court cases in other subject areas, and the 
result would depend on the general rules developed through those cases. 
These principles may also guide the courts where the parties are not 
members of the EU or EFTA. 
6.3.3.8 Addressing (Eliminating) these Obstacles by National Law 
One alternative way which could solve some of these practical enforce-
ability questions is to implement a clearer obligation in the Norwegian 
law targeting benefit sharing directly: by stating the all (closer defined) 
utilisations of genetic resources should trigger an obligation of Norwe-
gian law to share a part (which also must be implemented in the Norwe-
gian obligation) to a closer defined legal person.  
Clearly defined steps of utilisation of genetic resources and clearly 
defined points when benefits have arisen from such utilisation could 
circumvented several of the problems identified above.  
6.4 Addressing Obstacles Identified by this Thought 
Experiment in an International Instrument or Document  
When preparing the Norwegian Nature Diversity Act, the Ministry of 
Environment stated that this act would not solve all the issues related to 
ABS – neither the access side nor the benefit-sharing side. Based on this 
thought-experiment, that conclusion is even clearer: It does not solve all 
the issues relevant and necessary for creation of a legal enforceable and 
externally verifiable system. This is certainly not the fault of the Norwe-
gian government in any respect, as it has taken a serious and important 
step that will at least enable and mandate greater attention to user-side 
issues within Norway. For purposes of developing an objective case-
based system that implements ABS in a functional way, however, it is 
clear that one country’s legislature, acting alone cannot resolve all of the 
challenges that would inhibit its courts from enforcing ABS obligations 
against that country’s users. 
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As demonstrated in the above thought-experiment, cross-border legal 
certainty in ABS will largely depend on balancing two types of interna-
tional mechanisms – informational mechanisms (using the CHM or some 
other international communication mechanism as an official source of 
information regarding every country’s legal choices relevant to ABS) and 
agreed legal mechanisms (identifying and agreeing, at the international or 
bilateral level, provisions and principles to apply in cases where the user 
has violated provider-side ABS law by failing to obtain a contract, permit 
or other specific instrument. These measures can address nearly all of the 
challenges described above, so long as the CBD countries are willing to 
make specific commitments regarding ensuring the official accuracy of 
information and evidence needed under both mechanisms, and also agree 
that they will consider the provider-side legal vehicle as a valid basis for 
enforcement and other legal action on the user side, so long as the pro-
vider/source country complies with relevant prerequisites. 
Similarly, where there is a contract or legally enforceable permit, some 
sort of model provisions might assist the ABS parties seeking to apply a 
provider-side ABS legal vehicle in user-country courts, if the ABS coun-
tries not only agreed on the model provisions, but also agreed that, where 
those provisions are used, they will be recognized in the courts of all 
ABS Countries as valid, enforceable provisions. 
Finally, some issues, especially the problem of identifying users of gene-
tic resources where the user has not complied with provider-side laws, 
can be possibly be addressed in the decisions which set the framework of 
the regime. For example, to avoid the evidentiary and practical problems 
relating to the identification of ‘genetic resources’, it may be most useful 
to focus the implementation/enforcement aspects of the framework on a 
different concept ‘utilization of genetic resources’. It should be more 
feasible to externally verify whether each individual or company is 
engaged in activities which ‘utilize genetic resources’ than to attempt to 
identify particular material as a ‘genetic resource’ by inspection. 
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7 Functional Building Blocks for the Regime 
One of the most consistent requests received by the authors relating to 
future contributions to the Working Group has been the request for speci-
fic recommendations and text. On one hand, as lawyers, we are always 
ready to make recommendations. On the other, however, we are mindful 
of our presumption in doing so, and beg pardon of any delegate who does 
not feel it appropriate. The objective of this action-paper, including this 
section, is to focus our attention on legal options and issues involved in 
making ABS functional. Therefore, we have focused on ‘what will make 
benefit sharing work’, and have attempted to avoid any involvement in 
the political decisions that are at the forefront of current discussions. In 
essence, this paper is not about which ABS political choices are made, 
but how they are drafted in order to endure that they can be imple-
mented. 
Our discussion focuses on the ‘components’ of the regime – the various 
smaller building blocks involved, including national provider-side and 
user-side legislation and various actions, mechanisms and decisions at 
international levels. In keeping with the basic approach of the CBD, we 
assume that the bulk of ABS implementation will happen at the national 
level. Recognising the cross-border nature of ABS, however, we also 
identify issues, tools and agreements that must be essentially international 
in scope, in order to promote functionality.  
This chapter divides our suggestions into three groups of actions: at the 
national, international, and bilateral levels. As demonstrated by the hypo-
thetical case-study of the situation in Norway, as well as by many years 
of developing and applying individual national provider-side legislation, 
it is clear that major legal deficits in ABS affect both provider-side and 
user-side actions. Solutions require a combination of specific agreement 
at international levels, individual legislative action at national level, and 
other measures (including bilateral agreement among governments) that 
increase the capacity of parties to ABS transactions to develop appropri-
ate and well-framed legal instruments (ABS contracts and other legal 
vehicles) that meet their needs as well as the needs of a court or agency 
that might, in future seek to enforce them. 
Normally, where the Countries are motivated to comply, the processes 
under an international instrument will be most easily adopted where they 
call for action at the national level.  
The following sections consider and discuss (i) which matters to be ad-
dressed though national law that is decided separately (and differently) in 
each country, (ii) which matters specifically agreed at the international 
level (whether immediately or within some specific time following 
completion of the current negotiations) and enabled at the national level; 
and (iii) which international mechanisms appear to be necessary to enable 
functionality. 
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7.1 Promoting Functionality through National Decision-
making 
It is common, where an instrument focuses on building consensus to 
achieve an internationally shared political objective, to speak of national 
action in general terms – i.e., to call on parties to adopt measures that will 
achieve certain specific elements of that shared objective. Where the goal 
is to mandate specific inter-country legal action, however, some matters 
must be more specifically mandated and relatively consistent from 
country to country. In each international provision, it is essential to deter-
mine which types of measures are needed. This is a basic question of 
functionality. To date, the ABS regime has operated entirely through 
unrestricted national-level choices regarding how (and indeed whether) to 
adopt ABS measures, and what those measures may contain. Many com-
mentators assume that the ABS regime will become functional if more 
countries adopt legislation under Article 15 and the Bonn Guidelines, and 
assume that such legislation will continue to be highly diverse.  
As demonstrated by the Norwegian hypothetical case study, in Chapter 6, 
above, however, there are some elements of the ABS regime that can 
only function if they are substantively agreed by all CBD countries, who 
all agree that provider-side legal vehicles that comply with those ele-
ments will be enforceable in their national courts against persons and 
entities under their national jurisdiction. In order to be valid in practice, 
however, it will be essential for all countries to adopt, enact or otherwise 
ensure that these provisions are part of their national legal basis under-
lying ABS implementation and enforcement.112 
7.1.1 Necessary Legal Provisions that May be Different in All 
Participating Countries 
As detailed in section 4.1.1, above, ABS relies heavily on many types of 
law that (i) differ greatly from country to country, but (ii) are so ingrained 
in the country’s national system that they cannot be changed simply to 
accommodate a single new international instrument. The following sec-
tions identify two such areas most relevant to ABS. 
7.1.1.1 Basic Commercial and Administrative Rights (Provider Side) 
One critical issue relates to the clarification of each country’s ‘access’ re-
quirements, in a form that will make it easier for users to know what is 
needed. This process involves determining how the general law of the 
provider country applies to ABS, including  
• the ownership of various kinds of property and/or property rights;  
• the particular rights of an owner under national law;  
• the finality of contracts and administrative/legal decisions; the rights 
of the party to a final contract or under a final decision;  
• legal protection of the parties to contracts and administrative docu-
ments and negotiations (especially the parties that are least able to 
protect themselves); and  
• the system for oversight, implementation and/or enforcement and 
for administrative or judicial action within the country. 
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Nearly every country has direct legislation or formally accepted practices 
addressing all of these matters, although at present few countries have 
officially considered how they will apply to ABS resources, activities and 
legal actions.  
It would be virtually impossible for the ABS regime to adopt provisions 
which require countries to change or harmonise these basic laws, for two 
reasons. First, all of the types of law mentioned above are very complex 
and detailed in many countries. The international regime negotiators 
would find it difficult to agree on the lengthy documents needed to im-
pose a harmonised law requirement. Second, however, if the negotiators 
were able to adopt specific calls to harmonise all relevant aspects of the 
above-listed legislation, its inclusion in the regime document would vir-
tually ensure that few, if any, countries would be willing to ratify it. 
Fortunately, legal certainty and a functional ABS regime do not depend 
on harmonisation of these points. What is important is that users, user-
countries, judges, prosecutors, arbitrators and others can know with cer-
tainty what laws of the provider-side country are relevant in each case or 
transaction. Instead, it seems essential to the functionality of the 
regime if each country should formally and officially identify the 
specific laws, requirements and relevant information necessary to 
inform any user can who owns the resources he seeks to obtain, what the 
relevant national laws require, and what his particular rights are. The 
regime instrument or other document could call upon them to officially 
provide this information through the CHM.113  
While many other political matters are discussed in the Paris Annex, 
these matters do not seem to affect specific functionality of the ABS 
regime. As such, they can appropriately be based on each country’s 
separate adoption of relevant provisions. 
7.1.1.2 Evidentiary Rules 
In addition to the above, it will normally be necessary for users and all 
other parties and decision-makers to know what specific evidence is 
needed (on both provider-side and user-side) to demonstrate that a 
particular user complied or failed to comply with national law. These 
provisions normally will include a fair mechanism for clarifying responsi-
bility, such as the following: 
1. A legal requirement that enables any user to document the legal 
sourcing of genetic materials, in order to avoid the liability described 
below; 
2. A clear rule regarding what kind of proof must be presented in order 
to meet the ‘documentation of source’ requirement (see 4.7).  
3. Where the user documents that genetic resources came from a 
foreign source country, he must have a way of proving that his 
utilisation is based on PIC and MAT (showing existing 
documentation, if it exists, or obtaining a new agreement otherwise.) 
4. A specific benefit-sharing amount (or standard for determining the 
amount in each case) and/or performance that would be required 
where a user could not make the above proof.  
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A great many other matters relevant to the ABS regime may be devel-
oped on a country-by-country basis, as stricter measures, but their en-
forcement by other countries might be difficult or voluntary. In addition, 
over the long term, there is a significant role for industry groups and vol-
untary collections of data. Through these means, the international regime 
can develop industry standards, and build up a common practical under-
standing of the particular elements of ABS contracts and the way that 
they can be consistently understood and implemented.  
7.1.2 Provisions whose Content Must be Agreed by all ABS Countries 
There are many aspects of ABS enforcement that may be difficult or 
impossible unless all countries agreeing to certain very specific require-
ments. For example, the acceptance by all countries of particular default 
and model provisions may be a major tool to resolve problems with reme-
dies and other legal actions. To enable their acceptance, it may also be 
necessary for countries to agree to enforce the model and default provi-
sions against citizens, entities and activities under their respective juris-
diction, so long as certain minimum standards are met. 
7.1.2.1 Default and Model Provisions 
Proposals regarding default clauses and model clauses may have varying 
levels of impact on functionality, depending on whether the CBD coun-
tries adopt them as (i) an ‘option’ which particular countries and/or par-
ticular ABS transactions may choose to apply, or (ii) a set of agreed pro-
visions which countries agree to adopt with regard to both their user-side 
and provider-side obligations.  
• Default clauses: To maximise the ability of a default mechanism to 
apply in a contract situation, the CBD countries could make two 
commitments.  
– First, as providers and source countries, they would have to 
agree to accept the default provisions, in any foreign legal, 
administrative or arbitral action taken where the user did not 
comply with the requirements of the provider-side legal vehicle.  
– Second, as user countries and countries enforcing user-side 
measures against persons, entities and actions under their na-
tional jurisdiction, CBD countries would need to agree to apply 
those measures.  
• Model clauses: The incentive of user and provider to use ‘model 
clauses’ for ABS contracts can be greatly affected by the question 
raised at the beginning of this section 7.1.2.1. In this connection, it is 
important to note the discoveries of ABS research to date: that in 
most circumstances, it would be extremely difficult (perhaps impos-
sible) and very expensive, to engage in governmental oversight 
necessary to compel a user to participate in ABS and obtain an ABS 
contract. Consequently, even if the regime is built using very strong 
mandatory language, its functionality and success will depend on 
creating incentives that encourage the user to participate. In light of 
the difficulties of oversight and enforcement, it would appear that 
very strong language and extreme requirements in mandatory provi-
sions and provider-side processes would normally operate to reduce 
this incentive, rather than to increase it. 
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It must be noted, that these mechanisms, although increasing the legal 
ability of user-side courts to implement ABS, may also create an effective 
‘minimum standard’ for the entire regime. As noted in Section 4.6.1, 
above, the impact of these clauses will depend on the level of perform-
ance they would impose (even where they are formally agreed). If the 
terms of performance under default clauses are difficult and certain to be 
imposed, then the default provisions themselves may generate an incen-
tive for the user compliance. Otherwise, they could operate as a perverse 
incentive, encouraging users to remove genetic resources ‘informally’ 
and wait and see if any action is ever taken.  
Finally, where the regime calls for cross-border enforcement and compli-
ance, it may effectively limit which provider-side measures the user-side 
country is required to apply the hypothetical case-study noted particular 
problems with regard to each potential claimant’s access to the court sys-
tem of another country. This is difficult to address legally. In some cases, 
it may be perceived as conflicting with the sovereignty of the country that 
is asked to commit to opening its courts to specific foreign actors in spe-
cific situations.  
7.1.2.2 International Agreement on Coverage Matters 
In addition to the matters described above, it must be noted that the prob-
lems faced by user countries in seeking to enforce ABS provisions multi-
ply rapidly where particular matters of coverage differ from country to 
country. For this reason, as noted in Chapter 2, it is essential for the cov-
erage of the regime to be agreed relatively concretely in the current 
negotiations. Without specificity at the international level, national provi-
sions implementing international ABS decisions may differ markedly – 
resources or activities which one country considers to be governed by the 
international regime may be excluded under the laws of another country. 
A similar disconnection might arise where some countries’ national laws 
exempt research activities and others do not, or where those exemptions 
differ from country to country.  
7.1.2.3 Definition of Utilisation of Genetic Resources 
As set forth in Chapter 4, the authors are keenly aware of the fundamental 
obstacle to ABS functionality posed by the difficulty in finding a way to 
externally identify which biological material or information constitutes a 
‘genetic resource’ to be governed by the ABS system. Our conclusion has 
been that the best solutions to this issue can be built around agreement 
among the parties on which activities constitute ‘utilisation of genetic 
resources’. If they are able to agree on this first step in making the regime 
functional, that process and negotiation might be very difficult. Conse-
quently, we offer the following example of a textual framework for that 
determination.  
The authors regret that we were unable to develop sample lists for the 
first example, fearing that our own expertises were not sufficient to 
identify all of the particular activities or characteristics that might be 
needed for such lists. We note, however, that any such list approach is 
virtually useless for purposes of functionality, unless agreed at the inter-
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governmental level (the development of 191 separate and different na-
tional lists would have little or no positive impact on regime functional-
ity). Accordingly, we have provided an example of a second approach, as 
a reminder of this option. 
Text example for including ‘utilisation of genetic resources’ as a 
formative element of a functional ABS framework:  
(a) the following is a list of activities that constitute ‘utilization of 
genetic resources’ for purposes of this instrument:  
[here insert a list of specific activities that will be considered to 
‘utilise genetic resources’]. 
(b) In addition to the items listed in (a), any activity that meets the 
following criteria shall be considered to be ‘utilization of 
genetic resources’ for purposes of this instrument:  
[here insert a list of the characteristics that define ‘utilization 
of genetic resources’]. 
 
If the above lists cannot be generated in time, a second approach is 
also possible: 
Not later than XXX, the Governing Body [or CBD COP or other 
body] shall agree on (i) a list of activities that constitute ‘utilization 
of genetic resources’ for purposes of this law and (ii) a list of 
objective criteria that shall determine which other activities shall 
be considered to be ‘utilization of genetic resources’ for purposes 
of this instrument:  
7.2 International Measures for Promoting ABS Functionality  
There is a strong element of internationality in the national measures de-
scribed in section 7.1, given the need to agree on some national measures 
in detail and to call on parties to adopt or provide information on others. 
In essence, oversight of this type of provisions is primarily the task of 
some international body (the CBD COP, a MOP or other Governing 
Body specially created for ABS, etc.) Beyond these, however, a function-
al ABS regime would appear to require other types of international action 
– specific mechanisms to assist the CBD countries. 
Inevitably, where the CBD countries will be expected to operate in a co-
ordinated manner, applying and enforcing legal requirements across na-
tional borders, it will be necessary to develop some mechanisms to 
facilitate cross border communication and functionality. The following 
are particular functional international mechanisms, which might be effec-
tive in addressing particular needs of the ABS regime and its function-
ality. 
7.2.1  Ombudsman 
There is relatively little dispute among the participants in the ABS nego-
tiations that ABS is unavoidably complex. Even if the basic framework 
for ABS can be simplified, the challenges of cross-border implementation 
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and the need to enable developing countries to gain access to, and make 
claims in, user-side courts and agencies will remain complex and diffi-
cult. Accordingly, best practice in applying a complex regime in this type 
of situation would involve the creation of an ombudsman or designation 
of some institution to serve that role. 
In the Scandinavian administrative tradition, there is a system of different 
kinds of ombudsmen; who are appointed because of their credibility to 
act on behalf of a group (in Norway e.g. children or women or the Con-
sumer) or the general Ombudsman appointed by the Storting (the parlia-
ment of Norway) to overview the administration. The ombudsman has in 
fact very limited actual decisive power; but he enjoys a high credibility 
because of his un-political position and experience in his field of respon-
sibility. He can both receive complaints from the citizens regarding a 
particular matter; or he can take independent initiatives in concrete cases. 
By creating a global ABS ombudsman there could be established an insti-
tution for following the implementation of the ABS system; and look at 
particular ABS cases. Preferable the ABS ombudsman should be an exist-
ing institution working the field of ABS. It should probably be chosen for 
its credibility of balancing ABS and enjoying ABS-relevant expertise. 
7.2.2 Financial Proposals 
The Paris Annex includes provisions for simplification of benefit-sharing 
through the use of an international fund similar to the Fund created under 
the ITPGRFA. This concept, which was raised, but not accepted, at the 
time that the CBD was adopted, may appear more reasonable now that 
more parties have become aware of the difficulties in attempting to 
develop and apply a transaction-by-transaction benefit-sharing solution. 
As noted with regard to the ITPGRFA, such a fund may be difficult to set 
up and slow to fill with money, however, its inclusion in the Treaty may 
signal that the Parties are ready to adopt such a fund as a simpler solution 
to the benefit-sharing challenges.  
7.2.3 Use and Evolution of the CHM 
The effective coordination of national measures to form an operational 
and legally ABS system appears to depend on the ability of users, pro-
viders, agencies, communities, NGOs, advisors, judges, arbitrators and 
others, from any CBD country to obtain officially sanctioned information 
about the key matters of certainty and evidence required by each country, 
with regard to access to, collection of and utilisation of its genetic 
resources.  
As noted in 7.1.1, above, it will be essential that  
• only official sources provide information to the CHM on these mat-
ters,114  
• all countries acknowledge and commit to the legal certainty of the 
matters they list in this way; and  
• all countries agree to recognise these provisions in their national 
user-side implement of ABS 
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If used in this way, the CHM can become the primary international 
implementation of the functional elements of cross-border implementa-
tion of the ABS regime. 
7.2.4 Communication Processes and Disclosure Requirements 
Another key international element of any cross-border legal relationship 
is the need for official communication between the various users, pro-
viders, middlemen, countries and others that are directly involved in each 
ABS transaction. Whether styled as an ‘ABS certificate’, a ‘voluntary (or 
mandatory) disclosure requirement’ or something else, official communi-
cations of this type are important for many reasons. As documented in 
Chapter 6’s ‘thought experiment’ a court seeking to implement or enforce 
an ABS legal vehicle of a provider country will need to have validation of 
many facts from official sources in another country. In addition, they fre-
quently need some basis for assurance that the courts and agencies of the 
relevant country will stand behind particular ABS contracts, permits or 
other legal vehicles. There may be many particular elements of any ABS 
that require proof, including  
• identification of the particular species, subspecies or population of a 
specimen being accessed or utilised;  
• proof that a the provider or country that provided the resource either 
was the country of origin or has “acquired GR in accordance with the 
CBD (CBD Art. 15.3); 
• documentation of the process by which it was achieved (certificate of 
source);  
• proof that the user obtained access to the material legally, from an 
authorised provider or owner (certificate of legal provenance);  
• documentation of the transaction or transactions by which it reached 
the hands of the particular user in question (certificate of origin);  
• proof that the initial acquisition of genetic resources by user or trans-
feree was done in compliance with the provider country’s ABS legis-
lation, ABS contract or other legal vehicle (certificate of compli-
ance); 
• proof that at the particular moment it is requested, the user or trans-
feree remains in compliance with the provider country’s ABS legis-
lation, ABS contract or other legal vehicle (certificate of current 
status); or  
• registration of particular types of users (non-commercial researchers, 
middlemen, or certain types of agricultural relief programmes, for 
example). 
In addition, as discussed in section 6.3, while the concepts of mandatory 
and/or voluntary disclosure in patent applications have some potential, 
such disclosure requirements need to be tied to both specific legal obliga-
tions and to specific incentives or mandates. If this can be accomplished, 
it may be appropriate to extend the coverage of such disclosures, apply-
ing them to applications for other permits, and other specific ‘check 
points’ which can indicate that a user of genetic resources has generated 
or is about to generate a sharable benefit from that utilisation. 
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7.3 Enabling Bilateral Action 
To date, some of the most successful ABS development (on both provider 
and user side) has involved the initiation of bilateral discussions between 
a specific provider country and another country whose citizens and enti-
ties propose to bio-prospect in or utilise the genetic resources of that 
provider country. Through such bilateral discussions, the two countries 
can determine key factors, including some of the matters identified in 
4.4.1 as essential ‘certainties’ for the development of any ABS relation-
ship. These negotiations can ‘prepare the way’ for the negotiation of par-
ticular ABS contracts by individuals and entities from the two countries, 
as well as helping to protect the parties against misunderstandings and 
allegations of bad-faith and/or biopiracy that may arise where the individ-
ual negotiation goes forward without confirmation of key certainties.  
A similar objective is also addressed through another avenue, by recent 
work in the development of ‘bio-cultural protocols’ at the community 
level, which might be preparing each community to negotiate more effec-
tively and expeditiously when approached by a particular user. One ad-
vantage of the bio-cultural protocol approach is that it is not limited to 
ABS and TK issues or genetic resources, but addresses and provides a 
community basis for participating in a full range of resource-related is-
sues that may arise and significantly affect the cultural, legal and finan-
cial rights of the community. The protocols essentially are directed at 
enabling the community to function as an entity and to operate from a 
base of community vision and to agree on shared objectives that can 
guide future negotiations and processes.  
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between the two and minimise ambiguities affecting ABS functionality.  
14
 UNCLOS Parties have not agreed which of the various marine areas are 
‘beyond national jurisdiction’. Many UNCLOS countries have not declared 
EEZs, for a variety of reasons, and some have chosen not to become party to 
UNCLOS owing to marine jurisdictional concerns. The CITES COP has fre-
quently, but unsuccessfully, attempted to agree on the meaning of the term 
‘ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction’, which appears in CITES text. If CBD 
countries succeed in adopting a definition of ‘areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction’, it may legally impact their respective national positions relevant to, 
inter alia, fisheries, CITES, and Basel Convention.  
15
 Currently (as of 1 August 2009, thirty-two CBD countries, including many 
landlocked countries are not members of UNCLOS. One (Somalia) is party to 
UNCLOS, but not the CBD. 
16
 UNCLOS's provisions for ‘marine scientific research’ apply only within na-
tional EEZs/territorial seas, and would thus not apply to most ‘ocean areas be-
yond national jurisdiction’, no matter how that term is defined. 
17
 Only a few countries have the technical facilities to monitor activities in their 
EEZs / OCSs beyond the range of binocular-assisted sight. The others could not 
know whether bioprospectors acted in or beyond national waters.  
18
 There are 159 CBD countries that are not party to CCAMLR. One country 
(USA) which is a member of CCAMLR is not party to the CBD. Under 
UNCLOS, CCAMLR is considered a regional fisheries management instrument, 
and other UNCLOS members (i.e. most but not all CBD countries) are responsi-
ble to cooperate with its efforts to conserve living resources of the oceans within 
the Antarctic convergence. 
19
 Henkel, Thomas, ‘A Perspective from Pharmaceutical Industry’, Presentation 
to High-level Experts Meeting – Addressing the Access and Benefit-Sharing 
(ABS) Challenges in the Context of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(Tokyo, 8-9 February 2007) and other remarks in that meeting. There are a large 
number of legal ways to obtain samples without contacting the source country. 
This type of avoidance would not be illegal, if the regime were designed to apply 
only where the user obtains access through source country ABS measures. 
20
 This might require the Parties to pose and answer a series of ‘mapping’ ques-
tions, similar to the scope questions described in Chapter 3 of this paper, above, 
mapping the relationship between ABS and conventional commerce. See also 
Tvedt and Young (supra note 7) at Chapter 2 and section 4.1. See also Young, 
T., 2003, Options and Processes for the International ABS Regime, IUCN Envi-
ronmental Law Centre pamphlet. 
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21
 See, e.g., Cabrera Medaglia, J. and C. López Silva. 2007. Addressing the Prob-
lems of Access: Protecting Sources, While Giving Users Certainty. IUCN Envi-
ronmental Policy and Law Paper No. 67, The ABS Series, Book 1. See also the 
‘Report of the meeting of the group of legal and technical experts on concepts, 
terms, working definitions and sectoral approaches’, 2-8 April 2009, 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/2. 
22
 The assumption that all types of provider-side legal vehicles for ABS (see part 
4.2 of this chapter) are equally effective is normally correct, when applied to a 
user who makes a positive effort to comply with the provider/source country’s 
national ABS requirements. The differences among these choices arise when one 
attempts to enforce the legal vehicle through legal or pseudo-legal (arbitral or 
other) process against a user who is not in the provider/source country. 
23
 The ‘utilization of GR’ as a basic concept for the ABS regime was detailed in 
Tvedt and Young (supra, note 7), at chapter 4, where the justification and legal 
basis for applying ‘utilisation of genetic resources’ as the primary trigger of ABS 
responsibilities is explained in detail. 
24
 As discussed in many different sources, including Cabrera Medaglia et al., 
2007; Young, 2006, intention is an element of every existing definition of 
‘genetic resources,’ and of every use of an alternative term (‘research samples’, 
‘genetic heritage’ etc.) except those who apply ABS to all biological resources. 
When controlled at the access level, the difference between genetic resources and 
other resources is determined by the intention of the holder -- unknowable at the 
time of collection. Even in the laboratory, a distinction between ‘biological 
research’ and ‘genetic research’ might cause the User to conclude that his work 
is not subject to ABS provisions. 
25
 In national legislation, it is common to include multiple approaches, especially 
both a list and a descriptive standard to apply to items not specifically on the list, 
as a flexibility tool.  
26
 As detailed in Tvedt and Young (supra, note 7) at 4.1.2, the ITPGRFA oper-
ates essentially as a subsectoral list of utilization activities (agricultural develop-
ment, agricultural genebanks and the seed sector), and links that list to a specific 
mechanism by which a limited group of resources are obtained, held, transferred 
and utilized, pursuant to a sectorally specialized set of requirements and proces-
ses. See also Hiemstra et al., 2006; and Tvedt et al., 2007, examining the very 
different concepts relevant to another agricultural sub-sector – animal genetic re-
sources. The subsector addressing wild animal genetic resources is also exam-
ining these questions. The 11th, 12th, and 13th CITES COPs all noted concerns 
that veterinary specimens would be used for commercial development, deciding 
not to adopt expedited or non-document-required transport of these specimens, in 
light of ABS concerns.  
27
 See Glowka, L, F. Burhenne-Guilmin, H. Synge, J.A. McNeely and L. Günd-
ling. 1994. A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity. IUCN Environ-
mental Policy and Law Paper No. 30. Glowka, L. 1998. A Guide to Developing 
National Legislative Frameworks to Determine Access to Genetic Resources. 
IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 34. Reid, W., S. Laird, C. 
Meyer, R. Gámez, A. Sittenfeld, D. Janzen, M. Gollin and C. Juma. 1993. Bio-
diversity Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for Sustainable Development. 
World Resources Institute. 
28
 See, Bhatti, S., S. Carrizosa, P. McGuire and T. Young. 2009. Contracting for 
ABS: The Legal and Scientific Implications of Bioprospecting Contracts. IUCN 
Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 67, The ABS Series, Book 4 at Chap-
ter 1.  
29
 A license or permit is a document which represents a governmental process, as 
such it straddles the division between individual instruments (such as contracts 
and other measures described above) and governmental processes. 
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30
 For example, although numerous enforceable contracts have been developed, 
those known to the author have all been ‘unsecured’ contracts. It may be that the 
application of legal mechanisms of secured transactions (mortgages and other 
security arrangements, may operate to eliminate some of the more significant 
limitations on the functional enforceability of ABS contracts. Discussed in detail 
in Young, T., ‘Contract Provisions and Experience’, Chapter 3 in Bhatti, Carri-
zosa, et al., (supra note 27.) 
31
 As detailed in Young, T., 2007 ‘Administrative and judicial remedies available 
in countries with users under their jurisdiction and in international agreements’ 
(posted as UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/INF/3 and summarized in 4.6 of this action-
paper), it is vastly easier from a legal perspective to enforce contracts than other 
types of legal mechanisms discussed in this section. 
32
 Ibid. Noting that one country’s laws and legal/administrative decisions are not 
enforceable in foreign countries, in the absence of very specific legal agree-
ments. 
33
 A similar principle may apply in the case of legislation, where a guideline or 
other non-binding instrument may be quicker for countries to adopt, and equally 
effective as a control on user actions, with regard to many users. This experience 
is found in many areas of law. (See Tvedt and Young, 2007, supra note 7, at 3.5 
and 6.1.2) In ABS, one of the few user-side measures currently functioning in 
ABS are the ‘Japanese Guidelines’, which are rigorously applied and broadly 
complied with, even though not formally binding law. Discussed at 6.2 of this 
action-paper. 
34
 CBD Art. 15.1. The CBD also reminds us, in Article 3 that ‘States have, in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of interna-
tional law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies…’ Normally, a State is not held to have abandoned 
its sovereign rights of a certain type, simply because it has not adopted a law 
whose title directly addresses that type of right. In other words, a state may still 
retain and recognize its sovereign rights in ‘genetic resources’, even if it has no 
law or provision specifically using this term. 
35
 Regulatory processes are simply time-consuming. Recent comparison of other 
multilateral environmental instruments shows that even more than 25 years after 
entry into force, some Parties to an MEA have not adopted the minimum 
national legislative or administrative measures that are unequivocally required by 
that instrument. Hårstad, J. et al. 2005. Evaluation of GEF Support for Biosafety. 
GEF This suggests that a primary reason for the low rate of adoption of imple-
mentation legislation may simply be time. The delay is hardly surprising given 
the legal and practical difficulties that national legislative developers and others 
must address in order to draft ABS legislation that will be legally acceptable to 
governmental attorneys and parliamentary decision-makers. 
36
 See note 19, supra. 
37
 Most information in this table derived directly from two basic sources: The 
ABS measures Database in the CHM, and the combined databases of ABS con-
tracts and contract provisions, developed by WIPO and by the authors of Bhatti, 
S., S. Carrizosa, P. McGuire and T. Young 2009. Contracting for ABS: The 
Legal and Scientific Implications of Bioprospecting Contracts. IUCN Environ-
mental Policy and Law Paper No. 67, The ABS Series, Book 4. 
38
 Holm-Müller et al., 2005 ; Latorre, 2005; Frison and Dedeurwaerdare, 2006. 
39
 Research into these issues is addressed in Young, T. 2006. ‘An Analysis of 
Claims of Unauthorized Access and Misappropriation of Genetic Resources and 
Associated Traditional Knowledge’, distributed at AHWG-ABS-4 as 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/4/INF/6. See also and IUCN-Canada, supra, note 9. 
40
 The ‘second MAT’ provision of Article 15 is contained in article 15.7, which 
focuses solely on equitable sharing (of research results and of benefits arising 
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from the utilization of genetic resources.) It provides specifically that ‘[s]uch 
sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms’. This indicates that the second 
MAT covers entirely different matters from the first, which requires in Article 
15.4 that ‘[a]ccess, where granted, shall be on mutually agreed terms’. 
41
 For example, the ITPGRFA’s provision calling in essence for a specific task – 
the revision of the CGIAR’s existing MTA to align with specific Treaty’s 
requirements – was adopted relatively expeditiously (although requiring difficult 
negotiations). By contrast, the Cartagena Protocol’s broader call for the COP-
MOP to ‘adopt a process with respect to the appropriate elaboration of interna-
tional rules and procedures in the field of liability and redress for damage result-
ing from transboundary movements of living modified organisms’ (Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, Art. 27) is now long past its original four-year deadline.  
42
 As discussed in Tvedt and Young, 2007, the questions of when and how bene-
fits arise, triggering a claim for benefit-sharing is legally unclear, and might pose 
a significant obstacle to the enforcement of benefit-sharing obligations.  
43 Examination of the earliest drafts of the CBD demonstrate that the objectives 
of maximizing conservation-related research was second only to protected areas 
as the primary motivation for the negotiation of the CBD, and was the specific 
reason for the initiation of the ABS concept.  
44
 Schindel, David, et al, 2008, ‘Submission of Views from an International 
Workshop on Access and Benefit Sharing in Non-Commercial Biodiversity Re-
search’, submitted to the CBD Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Compli-
ance in the context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-sharing 
(January, 2009, Tokyo) As detailed that report, a significant proportion of field 
scientific researchers operate focus on developing long-lasting cooperative 
relationships with relevant government agencies, including ABS compliance. As 
a consequenceIn some countries, the only persons who formally seek access to 
genetic resources under national law are researchers. At the same time, a large 
percentage of field research is conducted by academics, museums, biological col-
lections and other institutions which operate at a very low level of funding. 
45
 Efforts to distinguish non-commercial research from ‘utilization of genetic re-
sources’ (see, e.g., Fernandez-Ugalde, 2005) would have to take into account the 
reference to research results in Article 15.7, which suggests that research was 
originally believed to be within the scope of ‘utilization’ for this purpose.  
46
 The vast majority of all ABS contracts that have been made available for legal 
research were executed only by an individual researcher or field project manager, 
rather than by the company or institution sponsoring the research. The combined 
result of multi-year efforts by WIPO and a private consultant to collect copies of 
ABS Contracts (including agreements in force, models and forms) produced sev-
enty contracts, including a great many that were completely identical apart from 
the parties names. 
47
 A recent meeting of researchers focused on this issue suggested that the quali-
fication criterion should be membership (in good standing) in an organization 
which imposes clear requirements regarding the post-access transfer of genetic 
materials and extracts, as well as coordination with the source country prior to 
publication of data or research results relating to the genetic resources accessed. 
If this option is developed, it may be essential to enquire into the particular 
requirements of each such organization, and the manner in which it imposes or 
confirms compliance with them. Schindel, David, et al, 2008, ‘Submission of 
Views from an International Workshop on Access and Benefit Sharing in Non-
Commercial Biodiversity Research’, submitted to the CBD Group of Technical 
and Legal Experts on Compliance in the context of the International Regime on 
Access and Benefit-sharing (January, 2009, Tokyo). 
48
 BULGARIA: Biological Diversity Act: Art. 66.4 (‘Gratuitous provision of 
genetic resources may be agreed where the said resources are intended for non-
commercial purposes: scientific research, education, conservation of biological 
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diversity, or public health benefits’); and AUSTRALIA: AUSTRALIA: Environ-
ment Protection and Conservation Regulations, 2000, Statutory Rules 2000 Nº 
181, as amended (taking into account amendments up to SLI 2006 Nº 131, Parts 
8A, 9, 10, and 17). QUEENSLAND AUSTRALIA: Queensland Biodiscovery 
Act, Act Nº 19, 24 Aug 2004; and other documents available on the CBD’s ABS 
Measures database through March 2007. 
49
 See, e.g., the Tricolor frog case, described in Mgbeoji, 2006. The researcher 
who published research results about the frog’s unique poisons did not seek or 
receive any compensation or commercial benefit from that research. On the basis 
of the published data, however, multinational corporations filed 17 different pat-
ents for new synthetic compounds based on the researcher’s results. One has 
since developed and patented a product or pre-product. That company had no 
contact with the source country or any part of any Tricolor frog. 
50
 See, e.g., the Tricolor frog case, described in Mgbeoji, 2006. The researcher 
who published research results about the frog’s unique poisons did not seek or 
receive any compensation or commercial benefit from that research. On the basis 
of the published data, however, multinational corporations filed 17 different pat-
ents for new synthetic compounds based on the researcher’s results. One has 
since developed and patented a product or pre-product. That company had no 
contact with the source country or any part of any Tricolor frog. 
51
 In Bhatti, et al., (supra, note 27), the four editors made a concerted attempt 
over nearly five years of formal and informal information-gathering, to obtain 
copies of ABS contracts and anecdotal information about them. 
52
 The term ‘enforceable contract’ has a very precise legal meaning, which 
unfortunately differs from country to country. Not all contracts or legal promises 
are ‘enforceable’ and in many cases, the parties to the contract are not aware 
until they get to court that their contract is un-enforceable. Discussed in Bhatti, et 
al. (supra, note 27) at chapter 2. 
53
 Discussed in Young T., 2009 ‘Applying contract law to ABS’, Chapter 2 in 
Bhatti, et al. (supra, note 27). 
54
 Based on each country’s sovereign rights to its own biological (including 
genetic) resources (CBD Arts. 3 and 15.2), each country has the right to set 
whatever requirements and prerequisites it chooses on those who would take or 
use its genetic resources.  
55
 Discussed in detail in Young T., 2009 ‘Applying contract law to ABS’, 
Chapter 2 in Bhatti, et al. (supra, note 27). 
56
 Holm-Müller et al., 2005 ; Latorre, 2005; Frison and Dedeurwaerdare, 2006. A 
similar view applies to foreign-origin biological materials that have been grow-
ing in the user country for many generations. The user’s failure to get permission 
from the source country for the use of these materials normally is often not 
considered in ABS. 
57
 See ‘Report of the meeting of the group of legal and technical experts on 
concepts, terms, working definitions and sectoral approaches’, 2-8 April 2009, 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/2. 
58
 See Young, T., 2007 ‘Administrative and judicial remedies available in coun-
tries with users under their jurisdiction and in international agreements’ (posted 
as UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/INF/3 and summarized in 4.6 of this action-paper). 
59
 Legal difficulties encountered in the negotiation of ABS contracts, indicate 
that other instruments (MOUs, non-binding agreements, permits and joint work-
plans) have been equally successful up to now date in ABS.  
60
 To apply a unilateral default clause as a ‘pseudo-contract’ the user-country 
courts must obtain a signed agreement from the relevant official of the provider, 
agreeing to the default clauses in their entirety (without changing any element of 
the clauses). It must be noted however, that international negotiations in the area 
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of genetic resources have already chosen to adopt many innovative mechanisms 
whose legal impact is not known. These issues have been addressed in the 
ITPGRFA through the innovative, and as yet unvalidated use of shrink-wrap and 
click-wrap contracts to impose affirmative duties on parties who have not met 
any of the contractual requirements that would otherwise bind them.  
61
 This would include showing, where genetic resources were acquired from a 
country other than a ‘country providing genetic resources’ as defined in Article 2 
of the CBD, that the country had ‘acquired [those resources] in accordance with 
the Convention’ (CBD, Art. 15.2). 
62
 In most countries, collection of judgments in criminal matters happens through 
a process which results in payment of the funds into the national treasury or 
other financial account of the government. Relatively few criminal matters result 
in remedies or other payments to the person who was injured by the criminal act. 
In civil matters, the collection of remedy following judgment or arbitration is a 
private matter, backed up by the legal system. The winning party must either 
formally collect the amount, or comply with the relevant laws that govern how 
he enlists the assistance of police or other officials to formally compel payment. 
This issue was discussed in more detail in Young, T., 2007 ‘Administrative and 
judicial remedies available in countries with users under their jurisdiction and in 
international agreements’ (posted as UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/INF/3). 
63
 With regard distribution of benefits, it is useful to recall that the CBD includes 
for two separate MAT requirements – one for access, and another for benefit 
sharing. CBD Arts. 15.4 and 15.7. While the two MAT processes may be nego-
tiated together in some cases, this may not be possible in all situations. At 
minimum, the ‘second MAT’ provision indicates that the provider country’s 
sovereign rights include the right to designate the manner in which benefits are 
shared and the form this will take. It also, however, indicates that this is a matter 
for negotiation, and that a user who does not agree with the provider’s position 
regarding how benefits will be distributed can attempt to negotiate an alternative 
option. 
64
 Detailed in T., 2007 ‘Administrative and judicial remedies available in coun-
tries with users under their jurisdiction and in international agreements’ (posted 
as UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/5/INF/3 and summarized in 4.6 of this action-paper). 
65
 The authors recognize that ‘simple’ is a relative term, and that the solution 
proposed in this paragraph, although quite straightforward legally, would be 
extremely difficult politically. 
66
 In any room containing ten lawyers and a question, one is likely to find 10 dif-
ferent legally supportable answers to the question. Particularly when the question 
relates to the application of a particular law to a specific factual situation, there 
may be a very large number of subtly different legally valid interpretations. 
67
 It is possible in many countries to take a case to judgment in the provider 
country, without the presence of the defendant. Such judgments are frequently 
impossible to collect, unless / until the defendant happens to return to the pro-
vider country. 
68
 No formal benefit-sharing payments have yet been paid by recipients of 
PGRFA under the MLS. In the meantime, some donor agencies have provided 
initial funding which is being distributed to developing countries for projects 
developing national collections and addressing other food and agriculture-related 
needs.) The same type of mechanism that is now used in the ITPGR was 
proposed and rejected in the original ABS negotiations at the time of creation of 
the CBD. This approach may be a more acceptable concept now, particularly 
when limited to the situation of users who do not know with certainty which is 
the country of origin of their resources. 
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69
 Demonstrated in Anton, M., N. Dragffy, S. Pendry and T.R.Young (eds). 
2002. Proceedings of the International Expert Workshop on the Enforcement of 
Wildlife Trade Controls in the EU. IUCN-ELC and TRAFFIC International. 
70
 This is the approach used in CITES, although in some countries the CITES 
certificates are not sufficient to overcome diplomatic obstacles relating to 
enforcement of violations (see Ibid.). 
71
 Ruiz, M. and I. Lapeña (eds.) 2007. A Moving Target: Monitoring the Interna-
tional Flow of Genetic Resources. IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper 
No. 67, The ABS Series, Book 3. 
72
 In the ABS context, there has been a different between ‘incentive measures’, 
‘motivation measures’ and ‘voluntary measures’, although some participants 
assume that the three terms mean the same thing. Basically, an ABS incentive 
measure is a legal provision which states that a user will receive some particular 
‘reward’ which is not available to other users, if he complies with ABS require-
ments. Many delegations distinguish between incentive and motivation assuming 
that, in an incentive the ‘reward’ is either money or some other direct value, 
while a motivation provides its reward in the form of non-monetary benefits, 
such as good will, or a publicized reputation for social responsibility. Finally, the 
third category ‘voluntary measures’ refers to user options that are described and 
permitted, but not supported by a reward mechanism. 
73
 As a practical matter, from a very simple fact: most ‘genetic resources’ are 
found within biological material, and most biological material may be moved 
across national boundaries legally. Some exceptions to this statement exist for 
species are thought to be dangerous (dangerous or poisonous animals, plant 
pests, narcotic substances, ‘weaponized’ bacteria, etc), whose international 
movement is sometimes prohibited. Even these species may often be legal to 
own or use, once they have successfully crossed the border. These controls have 
limited impact, even though they address only a small number of species. Once 
he has a specimen in hand, a user’s operations are often not overseen or oversee-
able by external or government observers. Although this lack of observability is 
not an excuse for non-compliance with ABS, it does make noncompliance very 
difficult to discover, and may constitute an element of a perverse incentive, that 
encourages users not to disclose their activities. To address this problem, user-
side measures must either (i) impose controls (command and control) on the 
users’ actions in the user-side country, (ii) provide a legal incentive or other 
motivation for user compliance or (iii) (preferably) both.  
74
 The primary impact of the ISO-14000 series of standards has been in the pre-
product value chain, where producers sometimes require that companies they 
deal with be certified using the ISO 14000 and 9000 standards. 
75
 According to the CBD Secretariat, ‘Denmark and Sweden provide examples of 
situations where access and benefit-sharing requirements are to be met as a pre-
requisite for funding. In Denmark, as set out in the submission, providers of 
funding for research and development projects should, by contract, include the 
application of the Bonn Guidelines as part of the conditions for funding. In Swe-
den, a policy adopted by the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency requires the establishment of a material transfer agreement between the 
provider and receiver of genetic material in research cooperation activities 
financed by the Agency where those activities involve genetic material. From the 
Note by the Executive Secretary, Analysis of Measures to Ensure Compliance 
with Prior Informed Consent of the Contracting Party Providing Genetic Resour-
ces and Mutually Agreed Terms on which Access Was Granted, and of Other 
Approaches, Including an International Certificate Of Origin/Source/Legal 
Provenance’, UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/5, at para 29, ‘Incentive measures’, citing 
‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, “The Implementation by the European Community of the ‘Bonn Guide-
lines’ on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing under the Convention 
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on Biological Diversity”, Brussels, 23.12.2003, COM(2003) 821 final, p. 22’. 
The US’s ICBG under the National Institutes of Health reportedly also uses ben-
efit sharing as a factor in the grant approval process. Rosenthal, 1996; Rosenthal, 
2006; and Rosenthal et al., 1999.  
76
 See Smith, A. and T. Young. 2006. ‘Innovative financial and incentive mech-
anisms for promoting the conservation of High Conservation Value Forests’. 
Forest Stewardship Council.. For forest certification, the primary benefit offered 
is access to a market for certified timber, for example. That market has been slow 
to develop. In addition, as more users qualify for the incentive, the value of the 
reward might diminish. This has been demonstrated in economic terms in con-
nection with the ‘payment for environmental services’ concept. As a conse-
quence PES is evolving away from the approach which would make the 
payments self-sustaining, to a broader efforts to develop markets for PES, while 
ensuring that they don’t grow unsustainable as the market expands. 
77
 Several historical examples of this process are discussed in Young, 2004, ‘An 
Examination…’, at 50. See also Börkey, P, M Glachant and F Lévêsque. 1999. 
Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy: An Assessment. OECD, at 42 
and 129 (assessing voluntary mechanisms and noting that such mechanisms have 
limited impact, unless they are used selectively, as part of a ‘policy mix’ that 
enables them to address issues where other mechanisms are either not needed 
(because there is a strong desire to cooperate) or not possible (because the basic 
system and relevant understandings not yet developed.) In some cases, the gov-
ernment may ultimately decide to formally adopt the voluntary standards, to 
ensure that the system is uniformly recognized. 
78
 See the International Consortium of Botanic Gardens (ICBG) principles – 
‘Principles on access to genetic resources and benefit sharing for participating 
institutions’ (available at www.rbgkew.org.uk/conservation) and the Internation-
al Plant Exchange Network (IPEN) Code of Conduct (www.biologi.uni-ulm.de). 
79
 Micro-organisms Sustainable use and Access International Code of Conduct 
(MOSAICC), available at www.belspo.be/bccm/mosaicc.  
80
 UNCTAD, Draft concept note: Practical Guidelines for Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits of Biological Resources in BioTrade Activities, 3 March 2007. Discus-
sion in this book is based on the 31 January 2007 draft (not yet available for 
citation). It is discussed here with permission from the BioTrade initiative. 
81
 To be effective incentive systems must include some types of oversight to 
protect against abuse – i.e., to ensure that the ‘reward’ is only available to those 
who have met the requirements. Thus, Incentive measures are not cost-free to the 
government, since it will be essential to have mechanisms for confirming com-
pliance, for preventing attempts to obtain the incentive without complying, and 
for keeping records. See, Smith and Young, 2006.  
82
 CBD Arts 16-18. 
83
 The ISO has undertaken numerous studies and analyses on this point, docu-
mented through their work on Social and Environmental Responsibility Stand-
ards. 
84
 Whereas ‘equity’ refers to a duty to ensure a high level of fairness, ‘equality’ 
means something very different. Equity recognizes that all parties are different 
and have different needs, and imposes a duty on the stronger or more sophisti-
cated party to take measures to ensure that negotiations are fair and all parties 
operate on a ‘level playing field’. A duty of equality, if it existed would require 
parties to be or become actually equal. This is probably not possible in law. 
85
 Outside of the international negotiations there are few experts who understand 
the ABS concepts, and even they admit to being uncertain about how an ABS 
contract would fare in the courts, if a claim were to arise. Up to now, although 
there have been several court cases regarding situations which include ABS-
related issues, those cases have never applied or addressed the ABS issues. No 
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formal case has ever been filed alleging ABS violations or breach of an ABS 
contract. IUCN-Canada, (supra, note 27).  
86
 Ot.prp 52, 2008-2009, p. 311.  
87
 Ot.prp 52, 2008-2009, p. 312. 
88
 § 60. (genetisk materiale fra andre land) Innførsel for utnytting i Norge av 
genetisk materiale fra en stat som krever samtykke for uttak eller utførsel, kan 
bare skje i samsvar med slikt samtykke. Den som rår over materialet, er bundet 
av de vilkår som er satt for samtykket. Staten kan håndheve vilkårene ved søks-
mål til fordel for den som har satt dem. 
89
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